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In recent years there have been widely publicised discussions and even public outcries 
relating to what seems to be excessive remuneration packages received by CEOs, both 
in South Africa and abroad. While there is a fairly extensive body of academic 
literature that has investigated the relationship between executive remuneration and 
company performance, no research could be found that has investigated how 
employees’ perceptions of executive remuneration, in relation to company 
performance, influences perceptions of fairness or justice.  
Research Purpose: 
The main objective of the present study, which was conducted within the South 
African financial services industry was to establish whether executive remuneration 
(consisting of basic salary and short-term incentive bonuses) and company 
performance (in terms of return on equity) affects employees’ perceptions of fairness.  
Motivation for the Study: 
In the South African context there are many senior executives that in most peoples’ 
opinion earn excessive salaries and bonuses, this while the organisations’ that they 
lead perform poorly. As a consequence of their organisation performing badly, 
employees need to be retrenched, yet executives seemingly do not forego or even 
reduce their salaries or bonuses in order to retain employees and improve the 
organisation’s bottom line. The widely publisicised (often extreme) examples of this, 
illustrate and are explained by the disconnect that is currently taking place globally, 
specifically in South Africa. This disconnect is that of inequality of wealth between 
the rich and the poor as measured by the Gini Coefficient, in which South Africa is 
now ranked the most inequal country in the world. The aim of the present study is to 
better understand some of the dynamics that influence perceptions of fairness in such 
scenarios. The present study has implications for organisations in terms of distributive 
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justice outcomes, Human Resources practices and policies, as well various impacts on 
employee motivation and satisfaction. 
 
Research Design: 
A quantitative research approach was followed and a 2³ full-factorial experimental 
design employed to investigate the research question. A convenience sampling 
approach was used and data was collected by means of an online questionnaire. 
Financial data relating to Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) listed financial services 
organisations and their executive remuneration and company performance was 
extracted and analysed in order to construct eight experimental stimilu. Each 
respondent was given one of these stimuli scenarios to consider and asked to rate their 
perception fairness of the remuneration package. Respondents were then given two 
sets of additional information and each time asked to again rate the fairness of the 
remuneration package. This was done to investigate the impact on fairness if more 
contextual information is provided. Employees who responded to the survey (n = 97) 
were from various sectors of the financial services industry. The manipulation check 
for the experimental stimuli groups was analysed utilising a one-way ANOVA. Data 
from the full-factorial experiment in terms of the eight condition groups was analysed 
using descriptive statistics, Principal Component Analysis, a full-factorial ANOVA 
and a repeated measures ANOVA. 
Main Findings: 
The results from the full-factorial ANOVA revealed that there was no statisticaly  
significant main effect differences between the percieved levels of fairness for each of 
the eight stimuli groups. Participants perceptions of fairness did not change 
statistically or numerically significantly when given additional information relating to 
executive remuneration  and company performance. No further analysis was done in 




Practical Organisational Implications: 
The employee and organisational implications with regards to perceptions of fairness 
and distributive justice by employees may aid organisations in developing and 
structuring corporate governance, corporate communication and public relations 
documentation, as well as HR policies and procedures that bring about employee buy-
in and transparency with regards to executive remuneration and company 
performance metrics. 
Contribution/Value Proposition: 
The link between executive remuneration and company performance has been 
investigated extensivly in the past, yet no literature could be found where the 
perceptions of employees and role players have been investigated, in this regard. 
Moreover, experiments are not common in HR literature and this study makes a 
contribution in showing how experiments can be conducted to answer HR related 
research questions.  
Keywords: Executive Remuneration, Company Performance, Perceptions of Fairness, 
Distributive Justice, 23 Full Factorial Experimental Design, Factorial ANOVA, 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
Executive remuneration has received extensive focus and attention over the last few 
years, both in the media as well as academic research and literature. Much of this 
interest is, however, due to the negative perception of the general public that 
executives earn excessive remuneration packages in comparison with other employees 
within organisations (Bradley, 2013; Ozkan, 2011).  
A significant number of financial scandals in the late 20th century, culminating in the 
financial crisis of 2008 has led to a global recession. The down-turn in several large 
economies have resulted in mass retrenchments and other expense reducing measures, 
while executives continued to receive large remuneration packages during periods of 
austerity (Bradley, 2013; Jasso & Milgrom, 2008; Theunissen & Oberholzer, 2013). 
Much of these financial crises were centred around large corporates, such as Enron, 
WorldCom, Parmalat and Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., in which one of the major 
contributing factors of all of these scandals were large bonuses that were being paid to 
the executives of these companies, this while share prices were overinflated and 
financial accounting indicators and statements were incorrectly and in some cases 
even fraudulently overstated (de Wet, 2012; Heimann, Mullet, & Bonnefon, 2014; 
Mueller, 2006; Theunissen & Oberholzer, 2013).  
While there have been no notable South African financial scandal in the last decade 
that has had widespread economic implications relating to a national recession, there 
has been many reports of corruption, misappropriation of funds and large bonuses 
paid out to executives in both the private and public sectors (de Wet, 2012; Ensor, 
2010; Financial Mail, 2008; Finweek, 2012; Theunissen & Oberholzer, 2013). 
Furthermore, due to the sensitivity of these allegations and the increased awareness of 
the levels of remuneration executives receive by the South African workforce, 
particularly workers at the lowest levels, this poses serious economic and 
organisational questions. One such incident in July 2011 was related to striking Sasol 
workers that caused national fuel shortages. These strikes were a protest against 
massive pay hikes of the executives at Sasol (Khu Zwayo & Matomela, 2011).  
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Concerns surrounding the remuneraiton of executives has led to the seemingly 
excessive remuneration packages of CEOs in South Africa being widely publicised 
and becoming subject to public scrutiny (Bonorchis & Crowley, 2014; Lamprecht, 
2014; Massie, Collier, & Crotty, 2014; Ngobese, 2013). Many commentators have 
voiced serious concerns that executives, in particular CEOs, are being remunerated to 
the detriment of shareholder’s interests and indeed the long-term success of the 
companies that they work for (de Wet, 2012; Resnick, 2013; Theunissen & 
Oberholzer, 2013).  
The most popular theory that defines and can be attributed to controlling executive 
remuneration is agency theory, often also referred to as the principal-agent problem 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Scholtz & Smit, 2012). While 
the structuring of incentives involved in executive remuneration have changed 
considerably since 1856 when the first joint stock exchange was established, when 
compared to present day structures, agency theory has remained the most approriate 
framework with which to describe the relationship between shareholders and 
executive directors, and the aligning of their interests (Amess & Drake, 2003; Scholtz 
& Smit, 2012).  de Wet (2012) identified how agency theory is still used in all modern 
executive remuneration and company performance literature, in which company 
shareholders are viewed as the principals and management, specifically the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO), as the agent. Even under the assumption that if the agent 
were to own all the shares of a company, they are unlikely to seek to maximise the 
value of the firm, but rather look to further their own financial ends (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Agency costs, which allows for the alignment of agent goals with 
that of the shareholders, such as short-term and long-term incentive bonuses and plans 
are structured to motivate agents to act in the interest of the shareholders and 
maximise shareholder wealth on a sustainable basis (de Wet, 2012; Resnick, 2013; 
Scholtz & Smit, 2012). If the goals of the agent are not aligned to that of the 
shareholders, a situation exists where the executives of the company could abuse their 
rank and power within the company to their own advantage and to the detriment of the 
shareholders (Carlos & Nicholas, 1996). In order to address the potential 
misalignment between agents and shareholders, corporate governance measures, 
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specifically focusing on executive remuneration have been established. Examples of 
such measures are the Cadbury Committee in the UK, which in 1992 brought about 
worldwide reforms in corporate governance systems (de Wet, 2012); the American 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) executive remuneration policies; the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (Bradley, 2013; Kim, 2010); the South African King 
Code of Governance Principles; and the King Report on Governance, together with 
the Companies Act of 2008 (Bradley, 2013; de Wet, 2012; Institute of Directors of 
Southern Africa, 2009; Institute of Directors Southern Africa, 2002). While agency 
theory has been the dominant framework that has linked executive pay and 
performance, there has been some research that questions the validity of this view, 
stating that the theory’s view of pay and performance has a narrow focus when 
evaluated in terms of the developments in institutional theory (de Wet, 2012; Dittman 
& Maug, 2007; Main, Bruce, & Buck, 1996). Main, Bruce and Buck (2005) suggest 
the utilisation of three theories to be used as different lenses to look at executive 
remuneration, namely stewardship/stakeholder, executive power and principal-agent 
theory, which while drawing heavily on agency theory focuses on the intrinsic 
rewards that executives receive that are easily quantifiable. Due to the close link these 
theories have to agency theory, and the relative small body of literature that has been 
amassed, agency theory still remains the most robust framework in which to 
investigate the relationship between executive remuneration and company 
performance. 
While a large volume of academic literature with regards to executive remuneration 
has come out of the United States of America, Canada, the United Kingdom and 
Europe, a small yet empirically sound body of literature has emerged which 
investigates executive remuneration in the South African context, specificly of 
publicly traded companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). Much of 
these investigations have been in relation to company performance indicators such 
Return on Equity (ROE), Return on Assets (ROA), Earnings Per Share (EPS) and 
more recently economic value added (EVA) and market value added (MVA) (de Wet, 
2012; Resnick, 2013; Scholtz & Smit, 2012; Theunissen & Oberholzer, 2013). There 
seems to be consensus in the literature that there are strong links between South 
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African executive remuneration and company performance, particularly traditional 
accounting performance indicators such as ROE, ROA and EPS, while EVA and 
MVA measures have showed weaker relationships with executive remuneration (de 
Wet, 2012; Resnick, 2013; Scholtz & Smit, 2012). A similar study conducted by 
Fatemi, Desai and Katz (2003), based on American companies, showed stronger 
relationships with MVA and EVA. These results are attributed to executive 
remuneration committees structuring executive incentives that are aligned with 
economic and market value add rather than more traditional performance measures 
currently utilised by their South African counterparts. 
While a large amount of academic literature has been amassed in terms of 
investigating executive remuneration and the relationship (or lack thereof) with 
various company performance metrics. No research could, however, be found that has 
assessed the perceptions of fairness of employees when considering the remuneration 
given to executives, more specifically when the remuneraiton is contrasted with 
company performance indicators. As pay transparency and corporate governance 
measures continue to bring greater transparency, allow for more scrutiny and strive to 
ensure that executive remuneration, specifically short term incentive bonuses, are 
aligned to defined company performance metrics in order to ensure a pay for 
performance culture with higher levels of visibility, debate and critisism will ensue. 
Pay transparency, perceptions of fairness and organisational justice have far ranging 
and far felt organisational implications for employees, which include such outcomes 
as employee performance, affective commitment, turnover intention, voluntary 
turnover behaviour and absenteeism (Heneman & Judge, 2000; Kinicki, McKee-
Ryan, Schriesheim, & Carson, 2002; M.L Williams, Brower, Ford, Williams, & 
Carraher, 2008; M.L. Williams, McDaniel, & Nguyen, 2006).  
The aim of the current study was to investigate, in a controlled experimental 
environment, the influence of executive remuneration data (executive basic salaries 
and short term incentive bonuses) and company performance metrics, obtained from 
annual financial statements and reports, on employees’ perceptions of fairnes. The 
objective of this research was to show the impact of executive remuneration and 
company performance on employee’s perceptions of fairness and distributive justice. 
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Furthermore, to investigate to what extent the perception of fairness changes (or does 





CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Executive Remuneration 
Rappaport's (1983) seminal work on the issues regarding incentive plans and the 
apparent lack of association between shareholder return and the salary increases 
executive received, posed three relevant questions. The first question aimed to 
investigate why various compensation programs are often unsuccessful in motivating 
executives to practise strategies that will create economic value for shareholders. The 
second question asked why organisations do not link executive compensation and 
incentives directly to shareholders returns. The last question asked if there were any 
internal shareholder value creation performance measures that are sound, in a 
theoretical sense, while having the ability to be implemented practically (Rappaport, 
1983). Rappaport (1983) warns of the risk of the principal-agent problem as defined 
above, in that too much consideration to the management of accounts and accounting 
ratios should not detract and draw away awareness of ongoing and operational 
concerns of business. 
Jensen and Meckling's (1976) agency theory and Ireland's (1996) stakeholder’s model 
of an organisation, state that the activities of top executives in an organisation are 
linked to the performance of the organisation and therefore need to be monitored by 
the shareholders of the organisation. The activities of top executives should at all 
times be ethical, lawful and in line with mandated risk principles (being risk free or 
risk adjusted). Therefore, in order to reduce agency costs shareholders incentivises top 
executives to align their activities with the interests of shareholders in proportion to 
the performance level and metrics that they achieve. This has brough about a modern 
concept of performance-linked remuneration for top executives, where incentives and 
rewards for top executives are based on informed and appropriate decisions and that 
incentivise actions and projects that will increase the value of the business that in turn 
offer greater returns to shareholders (Main et al., 1996; Resnick, 2013; Scholtz & 
Smit, 2012; Theunissen & Oberholzer, 2013). 
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Performance-linked remuneration for executives. 
A number of studies have investigated performance-linked remuneration for 
executives. These studies have shown that the remuneration structure for top 
executives has been structured around the performance of the specific organisation in 
the particular industry that they operate in (Amess & Drake, 2003; de Wet, 2012; 
Gregg, Jewell, & Tonks, 2010; Harris, 2009; Jasso & Milgrom, 2008; Rappaport, 
1999; Resnick, 2013; Scholtz & Smit, 2012). Almost all of these studies focus on 
financial performance aspects of the organisation in designing the remuneration 
packages of top executives. 
In a detailed study of 200 listed companies in the United Kingdom it was found that 
executive remuneration is made up primarily of three components, namely fixed or 
base salary, Short-Term Incentive Bonuses (STIBs) and Long-Term Incentive Plans 
(LTIPs) (Conyon, Peck, Read, & Sadler, 2000). Employee benefits made up the fourth 
component, however, the contribution as a percentage of total remuneration packages 
was found to  be insignificant. The quantitative averaging conducted by Conyon et al., 
(2000) indicated that fixed salary made up 54% of remuneration packages, STIBs 
made up 24%; and LTIPs 22%, where LTIPs were made up of cash incentives or 
company shares constituting direct ownership. 
Liu and Stark (2009) concluded that the modern trend in the United Kingdom is to 
separate Executive Share Options (ESOs) and LTIPs from each other. Doing so, 
forms four fundamental and distinct components of executive remuneration, namely 
basic salary, STIPs, LTIBs and ESOs. While basic salary makes-up the fixed and non-
variable component of executive remuneration, STIBs, LTIPs and ESOs are all 
performance-linked pay variables that are linked to company performance measures 
(Kim, 2010; Main et al., 1996; Massie et al., 2014; Resnick, 2013; Scholtz & Smit, 
2012; Theunissen & Oberholzer, 2013). 
Conyon et al. (2000) concluded that external consultants collated data in the preferred 
method utilised by UK executive remuneration committees in order to determine the 
levels of performance achieved by its executives. Furthermore, Bruce, Skovoroda, 
Fattorusso and Buck (2007) found that UK companies establish challenging criteria in 
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order for executives to earn the full potential of their performance-linked pay 
variables. The boards of these companies often opt for performance and targets that 
are easily measurable and were the criteria for achievement are made available to both 
the executives as well as all employees within the organisation in order to ensure 
transparency in line with generally acceptable corporate governance practices (Bruce 
et al., 2007). 
The level and magnitude of executive pay has been established to largely be 
dependent upon the size of the organisation that the executive works for (Firth, Tam 
& Tang, 1999). While cognisant of the above, no research has investigated the 
relationship between the value of remuneration and the quantum of the executive’s 
and organisation’s targets (Firth, Fung, & Rui, 2006). While the size of the 
organisation moderates executive remuneration, variations by country as well as 
industry exist. Also, level of remuneration is greatly dependent on the remuneration 
negotiation and agreements made between organisations and its executives (Ireland, 
1996; Resnick, 2013). 
As determined by corporate governance committees, ESOs and LTIBs are reflected 
separately in annual financial statements or treated as a variable components of 
executives’ salaries (Conyon et al., 2000; Firth et al., 2006; Resnick, 2013; Scholtz & 
Smit, 2012). There is a variance between countries in terms of the level of executive 
remuneration and the potential to earn LTIPs as opposed to STIBs, this is due to the 
cultural values of the relevant country (Main et al., 1996; Resnick, 2013). This is 
evident in Western organisations favouring STIPs in rewarding executives while 
Eastern organisations prefer LTIPs due to their long-term economic growth values 
(Conyon et al., 2000; Resnick, 2013). 
Japanese organisations place a large emphasis on long-term targets and as a 
consequence LTIPs, thus placing the security and sustenance of the business rather 
than short-term goals and the STIBs associated with them (Ang & Constand, 1997). 
Japanese organisations employ differing strategies in terms of the retention and 
accountability of executives and take a long-term view of slow, sustained 
performance to build a more secure, sustainable, risk-free or risk adjusted outlook for 
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the organisation. Shareholder wealth is often prioritised far less than it is in Western 
organisations due the banking industry having great influence of the organisations 
board structure and day to day operations while capital structures possess very high 
debt to equity ratios (Bryson, Forth, & Zhou, 2014). 
In line with the cultural values of Japanese organisations, employee satisfaction and 
retention are given very high priority, often superseding the interests of shareholders 
(Resnick, 2013). While Japanese executives are offered less mobility in their jobs they 
are offered greater job security when compared to their counterparts in the United 
States and the United Kingdom. As indicated in the literature Japanese executives 
receive a higher fixed component in terms of their total remuneration than variable 
components (Ang & Constand, 1997; Basu, Hwang, Mitsudome, & Weintrop, 2007). 
A study conducted by Brunello, Graziano and Parigi (2001) indicates that Italian 
organisations adopt the same philosophy as Japanese firms in terms of executive 
remuneration. 
Philippino organisations pay their executives mid-year STIBs that are linked to 
company performance and are in turn linked and calculated on performance measures 
such as share price growth, MVA and ROA (Unite, Sullivan, Brookman, Majadillas, 
& Taningco, 2008). These calculations are based on bi-annual data and performance-
linked STIPs utilising pre-determined formulae signed off by organisation’s executive 
remuneration committees. This data and the performance metrics used in determining 
the above STIPs is available to the executives in order to ensure full transparency 
(Unite et al., 2008).  
Executive remuneration in Chinese organisations is dependent on the nature of the 
shareholding of the organisation and pay-performance sensitivity is often present 
(Firth et al., 2006). Two shareholder structure scenarios are present in China, namely 
where the major shareholder is held by state-owned agencies where pay-performance 
sensitivity is not exercised or where the major shareholder is individual or private 
entity and pay-performance sensitivity is evident (Firth et al., 2006). In comparison to 
Western organisations, pay-performance sensitivities in determining executive 
remuneration are quite low. 
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Pay-performance sensitivity (PFS) is a measure to establish if executives are 
compensated appropriately in relation to how well they run the organisation. PFS is 
the change (either positive or negative) of executive’s remuneration, of which STIBs 
would account for the majority of the variability, with the given performance of the 
organisation they run (Clementi & Cooley, 2009). In its simplest form, PFS is the 
correlation between executive remuneration and the chosen company performance 
metric, as such ROE or EPS. PFS is used as an indicator of the quality of the 
organisations corporate governance. A higher sensitivity is a hallmark of a more 
aligned executive remuneration structure with the interests of the shareholders 
(Clementi & Cooley, 2009). A higher sensitivity demonstrates that executive 
remuneration responds more to changes in performance. 
The remuneration structure of executives in South Africa as portrayed in the academic 
literature is complex due to the multiple components that make up these packages 
(Resnick, 2013). These components while having a variable and performance-linked 
nature such, as STIBs, are often incorporated into basic salary packages (Ebert, 
Torres, & Papadakis, 2008). The majority of the JSE-listed organisations offer shares 
or options with no calculation and inclusion consideration of the remuneration 
package (Ebert et al., 2008). These share or options, however, may be subject to 
dissolution or forfeiture should the executive resign or be removed from the employ 
of the organisation (Resnick, 2013). A comparative study revealed that South African 
executives are paid (calculated in US Dollars) less than their respective counterparts 
in the United States, Australia, United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands and Hong 
Kong (Ebert et al., 2008). Furthermore, Ebert et al. (2008) concluded that executives 
have a higher performance-linked or variable pay component in their remuneration 
packages when compared to the structures and packages of executives in Western 
countries. The executive remuneration structure of South African executives as per a 
survey conducted by Price Waterhouse Coopers (2011) classifies remuneration into 
four broad categories namely, basic salary, STIBs, LTIPs and ad-hoc or other 
payments. Basic salary is the baseline and guaranteed salary package paid to 
executives in order for them to manage their person affairs, enhance their status as 
well as being afforded the recognition of remuneration as an executive. STIBs are 
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bonuses that are performance-linked to organisation’s chosen performance metrics 
and are payable to the executive in less than twelve months (Bradley, 2013). LTIPs 
are long-term orientated performance bonuses structured around the achievement of 
longer term goals as determined by the organisations board as well ESOs. Ad-hoc or 
other payments allow for other considerations that may be extended to executive but 
form a negligible amount of total executive remuneration (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 
2011).  
In summary, a literature review of executive remuneration reveals that the 
remuneration of executives consists of a number of common components, namely 
basic salary, STIBs and LTIPs. While STIBs and LTIPs are made up and paid in 
different means and distributions, basic salary is a fixed component of any executive 
package. STIBs are performance-linked variable pay cash incentives based on pre-
determined performance metrics as decided by the organisation’s executive 
remuneration committee. LTIPs are made up predominantly of ESOs and as such 
comprise of shares in the organisation. STIBs paid as a percentage of total executive 
remuneration and as a percentage of basic salary vary in different countries as 
indicated to the preceding literature review. In the South African context, STIBs are 
markedly higher than in other countries, while overall executive remuneration on 
average is lower than many other countries, in comparative US Dollars. For this 
study, the executive remuneration components that will be utilised in this study will 
consist of basic salary and STIBs. LTIPs were excluded from this study due to 
complexity of having to calculate the value of options and shares awarded during a 
year, thereafter collating this data for use, falls beyond the scope of this research. 
Moreover, a study conducted by Farmer (2008) indicates that share options offered to 
executives has steadily fallen from 38% of total executive remuneration in 2004 to 
23% in 2008, making this component less relevant as time progresses. 
For the purposes of this study any fixed remuneration received during the financial 
year will be included in the subtotal that formed basic salary of the executive. 
Director’s fees, cash remuneration and any other form of guaranteed compensation 
will also be included. STIBs are any unguaranteed form of remuneration. Basic salary 
will be analysed separately from STIBs, as the STIBs element of an executive’s 
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remuneration package is more likely to be dependent on performance than the basic 
salary component. All bonuses that are due to be paid in less than twelve months will 
be categorised as short-term incentive bonuses, and will be included in this 
component of remuneration. As observed by Levitt (2004), fringe benefits such as 
company expenses accounts or corporate jets, are often disguised and built into the 
remuneration package paid to the executive. Whereby applicable this study aims to 
include these benefits in the research. There currently exist varying LTIPs and ESOs 
utilised by organisations in order to reward their executives. Calculating the value of 
options and shares awarded and paid during a year and collating the data into a 
standard format, is beyond the scope and intended research of this study. 
  
Company Performance 
Multiple performance measures are utilised in assessing company performance of 
organisations and are applied by the executive remuneration committee when 
remunerating and incentivising executives. These measures range in what they 
actually measure but ultimately high performance in any of these metrics translates 
into increased bottom line earnings both for the organisation as well as the 
shareholders. The most common metrics include the monitoring of shareholder’s 
wealth and returns, ordinary share price, earnings per share as well as increases in 
profitability and revenue (Ang & Constand, 1997; Mehran, 1995; Murphy, 1985; 
Zhou, 1999).  Return on assets (ROA), return on shareholder’s equity (ROE), 
economic value added (EVA®), market value added (MVA), industry weighted share 
price, accounting returns such as relative performance evaluation (RPE), market value 
of equity (MVE) and net present value (NPV) are some of the most commonly 
utilised metrics in today’s organisations to evaluate organisational and as a 
consequence executive performance (Dow & Raposo, 2005; Fatemi et al., 2003; Firth, 
Tam, & Tang, 1999; Liu & Stark, 2009; Unite et al., 2008). Murphy (1998) concluded 
that there is no standard selection criterion for company performance measures and 
their alignment to executive remuneration. Bradley (2013), de Wet (2012) and 
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Resnick (2013) all conclude that the relationship between various company 
performance measures and executive remuneration ranges from moderate to strong. 
As mentioned above when reviewing the literature relating to executive remuneration, 
Western countries such as the United States, United Kingdom as well as the greater 
European Union have a focus on short-term incentives and bonuses. The same can be 
said of this short-term focus when it comes to financial performance, while the 
Eastern nations such as India, China and Japan, have a focus on long-term 
performance and sustainability (de Wet, 2012; Resnick, 2013). Metrics that measure 
increasing shareholders’ wealth of is primary importance in the West but not in the 
East (Murphy, 1998). Western organisations are heavily focused on maximising 
performance from deregulation measures whereby the impact of these deregulations 
will result in significant variance in the remuneration structures of executives (Cunat 
& Guadalupe, 2009). Cunat and Guadalupe (2009) observed that over time the 
variable component in executive’s remuneration packages, in the US banking and 
financial sector, had increased while the fixed component of these packages has 
decreased. This shift in the variable component of executive remuneration has been 
speculated to lead to an increased risk-taking attitude of executives that is not risk-
adjusted, due to the potential misalignment of said remuneration and company 
performance measures attributed to the inherent agent-principal problem, as discussed 
above (Resnick, 2013). 
A large disparity exists between the West and the East when the ratio of executive 
performance-linked pay in relation to fixed pay is considered. Western nations prefer 
a markedly larger performance-linked pay component than fixed pay, whereas Eastern 
nations prefer a larger fixed pay component (de Wet, 2012; Resnick, 2013). It is 
interesting to note that the literature finds that Western multinationals operating in 
various countries, both in the East and West, apply Western orientated standards of 
pay-performance related sensitivity with little to no consideration of what the local 
market sensitivity is (Murphy, 1998). Furthermore, the emphasis on the company 
performance measures utilised in executive remuneration packages varies both in 
terms of the owner and shareholdership of the organisation as well as the industry that 
the organisation operates in (Conyon & He, 2011). Conyon and He (2011) concluded 
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that the emphasis on performance pay varied in Eastern state-owned companies and 
those with independent directors. State-owned companies had flatter remuneration 
structures for executives with fewer performance related variables, where 
organisations with independent directors and shareholders have more variable 
performance components in their remuneration packages. Being cognisant of the 
above, the number of variable performance components are higher in Western 
executive remuneration models. There is also a markedly higher risk of Western 
executives losing their jobs if performance metrics are not met (Conyon & He, 2011). 
Consequently, the pressures of performing and exposure to risk of Western executives 
is much higher (Cunat & Guadalupe, 2009). 
Literature indicates that Western organisations most preferred performance measures 
are sales growth, share price growth, earning per share (EPS), return on equity (ROE), 
return on assets (ROA) and economic value add (EVA) (Chizema, 2010; Jensen & 
Murphy, 1990; Lee, 2009; Murphy, 1985, 1998; Santhapparaj & Tong, 2004). 
Research by Lee (2009) and Chizema (2010) indicates that ROE and ROA have taken 
far more precedence in the literature due to executives facing dual impacts according 
to these metrics in that these performance linked pay variables are linked to equity 
and asset performance and their returns respectively. While this trend of performance 
linked pay is evident in the West and is beginning to trend countries such as 
Singapore, Malaysia and Australia (Lee, 2009; Santhapparaj & Tong, 2004). Kato, 
Kim and Lee (2007) state that a similar trend is present in publicly traded entities in 
Korea, where executive remuneration has historically been shown to be significantly 
linked stock market performance of companies utilising measures such as EPS or 
share price growth. 
The emergence of the above has been defined by Kuang & Qin (2009) as performance 
vested share options (PVSOs) and demonstrate that PVSOs are different from 
traditional ESOs. PVSOs are designed in such a manner that they closely align the 
interest of executives with those of their respective board of directors and 
stakeholders. This new mechanism of PVSOs has been proven to reduce agency 
conflict between executives and stakeholders such that common vested interests are 
aligned to performance in terms of desired performance metrics. Executives with 
26 
 
ESOs and a significant equity ownership have a vested interest in ensuring long-term 
Initial Public Offering (IPO) performance and as a consequence closely follow the 
bull markets (Pukthuanthong, Roll, & Walker, 2007). 
Core, Guay and Larcker, (2003) research equity orientated remuneration to CEOs and 
the performance metrics of CEOs based on market valuations of equity as well as the 
relative performance evaluation of equities, are utilised in the vast majority of US 
based multi-national organisations across the globe. The survey indicated a trend 
toward short to medium orientated remuneration and metric schemes in line with 
O’Connor & Rafferty's (2010) findings that organisation’s boards set incentives 
aligned in such a manner that executives were motivated to take risks in order to 
increase the valuation of company assets thus increasing shareholders’ wealth. 
O’Connor & Rafferty (2010) go on to observe that executives achieved their 
incentivised goal of increasing shareholders’ wealth by gearing the capital structure of 
the organisation, thereby using more capital than they actual have in hand.  This type 
of incentivisation, while aligning executive and shareholder interests, demonstrates 
how dangerous this type of practice can and sometimes is (Resnick, 2013). The above 
is exactly what led to the infamous bankruptcy of Lehmann Brothers in 2008, while at 
the same time executives of the organisation such as Richard Fuld drew an executive 
remuneration package of $480 million at the time the organisation filed for 
bankruptcy (Clark & Schor, 2008). 
Kochar (1996) states that all organisations are subject to agency and transaction costs, 
agency costs is linked with self-interest and opportunism and transaction costs with 
economic efficiency of the organisation. Using both agency and transaction costs as 
lenses with which to view capital structuring, Kochar (1996) investigated how capital 
structuring has been used as a mechanism by organisations. Agency theory views 
capital structure as a tool that helps to reduce the agency conflict due to the constant 
and inherent interaction between executives and shareholders. Utilising this 
perspective, debt is a mechanism with which to reduce agency costs (Amess & Drake, 
2003; Kochar, 1996; Scholtz & Smit, 2012). In most leveraging situations, executives 
are contractually liable to pay the interest and repay the capital portion of the debt. If 
the debt is not used effectively and interest and capital repayments are not made, then 
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the debt lenders of finance will attach the assets of the organisation, under the proviso 
that the debt is secured (de Wet, 2012; Kim, 2010; Kochar, 1996). In corporate 
situations such as these, executives can have their decision making ability drastically 
reduced of even lost altogether, often resulting in them losing their jobs. The 
transactional cost perspective views capital structuring as a valuable mechanism in 
organisations assuming that lenders cannot interfere in an organisation’s operations if 
the contractual obligations of the debt repayment are met. Lenders would only 
become involved in corporate affairs and decision making when the damage has 
already occurred, so to speak (Kochar, 1996). Debt comes at a lower cost than equity 
due to lenders taking on less risk than the shareholders (Kochar, 1996). Debt is a tool 
with which agency costs can be reduced as high debt leveraging will also mean 
stronger controls and alignment of executives by shareholders, however caution needs 
to be exercised and corporate governance needs to be of paramount importance if this 
capital structuring perspective is to be utilised (Kochar, 1996). 
Being cognisant of the above, O’Brien (2003) argues that the capital structure 
supporting innovation and growth should have an adequate proportionality of equity 
in any organisational structure. However, an all equity financed capital structure will 
deplete a significant amount of cash out of the organisation due to the high cost of 
capital (O’Brien, 2003). O’Connor and Rafferty (2010) cite corporate governance 
policies and procedures in order to maintain balance between incentivisation of 
executives leveraging the organisation and engaging in risk taking behaviour or 
incentivisation derived from holding cash. Executives should be aware that taking 
risks such as leveraging debt has consequences. The organisation’s board should set a 
threshold value while linking executive’s variable pay components in maintaining a 
cash-in-hand value above said threshold (O’Connor & Rafferty, 2010). While 
focusing on short-term gains and growth are a sound corporate strategy, caution 
should always be exercised with regards to how these gains were achieved in relation 
to the organisations capital structure. For this reason, executives are often incentivised 
by including STIBs and ESOs in their remuneration package and contract, which 
stipulates an optimally leveraged capital structure while having the autonomy to run 
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the day-to-day operations and approve crucial capital-investment decisions (Dutta, 
2003). 
One should be mindful that the attainment of short-term targets place substantial 
pressure on executives to enhance the market value of equity by all means possible. 
Core et al. (2003) discovered that the shareholders of organisations viewed these 
targets as a technique to reduce agency costs due to agency conflicts, such that 
executives are closely aligned with the shareholders’ primary objective of maximising 
their wealth. Due to these pressures placed on executives, Core et al. (2003) stressed 
that these time-sensitive pressures resulting in STIBs result in high-risk taking 
attitudes which will in turn lead to the reduction of corporate governance 
effectiveness. A scientific model was created by Grundy and Li (2010) to test and 
monitor the actions of executives in Western organisations in line with investor 
attitudes. Their study revealed that if executives held significant LTIPs and ESOs in 
their remuneration package, they would be far more likely to make investment 
decisions that would contribute to the enhancement of positive sentiments toward the 
organisation, which consequentially increases the share of price of the organisation 
(Grundy & Li, 2010). In summary, executives endeavour to maximise the 
shareholders’ wealth by maximising investors’ positive outlook and sentiments. 
Being cognisant of the above literature review and discussion, three accounting 
measures that analyse company performance will be defined below. These measures 
are verifiable and widely understood and accepted (Murphy, 1999). Murphy (1999) 
stated that the primary determinant of executive remuneration and incentivisation is 
accounting profits. 
 
Return on Assets (ROA). 
ROA measures the profits that an organisation generates with the assets it controls. It 
is a good measure of the performance of management of the organisations, as it assess 
how well assets are being utilised by management in order to generate accounting 
returns (Bradley, 2013). ROA is a better measure of financial performance than 
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income statement performance measures, as it explicitly takes into account the assets 
that are used to generate returns. A few variations of this formula exist, but it is 
generally accepted that the most commonly utilised formula is that of ‘Return on 
Average Assets” (Bradley, 2013). Unlike Return on Equity (ROE), the capital 
structure of debt and equity chosen by executives does not affect the ROA formula 
and measurement. The ROA formula is reflected below (see Figure 1.1). 




Figure 2.1. Return on Average Assets formula. 
 
Earnings per share (EPS). 
EPS is another commonly used performance measure and is also utilised a common 
metric in calculating variable or performance based executive pay (Mäkeläinen, 
1998). It is described as a central and fundamental performance indicator for 
shareholders (Bunting, 2009; Otley, 2002). EPS is calculated by dividing the earnings 
(or profits) by the number of shares in issue (Bunting, 2009). EPS has the 
advantage of being widely recognised and accepted, which is demonstrated by the fact 
that it has been used as a company performance measure in most of the studies that 
investigate the relationship between executive remuneration and company 
performance (Resnick, 2013). Accounting measures such as EPS have many 
advantages, such as being affected by both revenues and expenses as well as forcing 
executives to focus on generating profits (Kozan & Boulanger, 2004). EPS has been 
criticised in recent literature with Authers (2010) stating that is ‘crazy’ to evaluate and 
remunerate executives based on earnings per share of company share price due to the 
volatility of the market as well as executives inability to influence both EPS or 




𝐸𝑃𝑆 =  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 − 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠
𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠
 
Figure 2.2. Earnings per Share formula. 
 
Return on Equity (ROE). 
ROE is a widely utilised performance measure and is readily used in both evaluating 
management performance as well as determining executive compensation (Pandya & 
Rao, 1998). Furthermore, it has been described as (Siciliano, 2003) as the most 
meaningful when evaluating publicly owned companies’. ROE is defined as net 
income divided by shareholder equity (Pandya & Rao, 1998). ROE has remained the 
most enduring and popular accounting performance measure, as it focuses on the 
returns to shareholders, which is of paramount importance to investors. ROE 
essentially is the measure of how well a company uses debt in its capital structure in 
order to increase and maximise shareholder returns (Bradley, 2013; Resnick, 2013). 
The ROE formula is reflected below (see Figure 1.3). 




Figure 2.3. Return on Equity formula. 
Being mindful of the above performance indicators and the preceding discussion, 
ROE will be utilised as the indicator that will represent company performance. ROE 
assesses executive’s decision making prowess, effective utilisation of corporate 
capital structure as well as the return to shareholders’.  
 
Distributive Justice 
The performance and culture of an organisation is often related to the commitment of 
its employees to collective values, which is in and of itself a prerequisite for 
cooperative behaviour (Tremblay, Sire, & Balkin, 2000). One of the most likely 
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factors to improve employee commitment and job satisfaction is that of perceptions of 
justice in the workplace (Tremblay et al., 2000). Research into justice in the 
workplace has focused and emphasised two aspects, namely distributive justice and 
procedural justice. Distributive justice strives to explain how employees evaluate and 
react to the amount and manner of compensation they receive while procedural justice 
examines the evaluation and reaction to the procedures used in order to determine said 
compensation (Tremblay et al., 2000). Essentially, distributive justice focuses on the 
ends or outcomes, while procedural justice focuses on the means utilised in arriving at 
these outcomes (Sweeney & McFarlin, 1997; Tremblay et al., 2000). In order to 
debunk and understand justice in the workplace, two approaches need to be taken into 
consideration. The first approach looks at a number of studies that have demonstrated 
that distributive and procedural justice have their own determinants as well as 
independent effects (Tremblay et al., 2000). Examples of this include perceptions of 
distributive justice having a greater influence over attitudes towards the results of the 
decisions, while perceptions of procedural justice can be utilised in order to predict 
attitudes towards organisations (Tremblay et al., 2000). The roles of justice vary 
according to the organisational context and type and manner of reward and as such the 
universality of this rule in not absolute (Greenberg, 1996). 
The second approach relates to employee compensation, literature has shown that pay 
satisfaction is a multidimensional construct with the antecedents and outcomes of pay 
satisfaction varying according to the specific dimensions of compensation (Heneman 
& Schawb, 1985). Heneman and Schawb (1985) identify five dimensions of 
compensation, namely pay level, pay increase, pay structure, employee benefits and 
pay administration. Several studies have investigated the validity of these dimensions 
(Carraher, 1991; Judge & Welbourne, 1994; Mulvey, Micelo, & Near, 1992; 
Scarpello, Huber, & Vandenberg, 1988), finding that there is a lack of consensus and 
agreement in terms of the number of dimensions that exist. The literature does 
however indicate that pay level and employee benefits satisfaction have sound 
psychometric properties that are resistant to organisational context and hence can be 
used as stable dimensions with regards to being compensation dimensions (Tremblay 
et al., 2000).  
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The effects of distributive justice and the perceptions of justice are best explained 
through Adams (1965) equity theory which hypothesizes that employees evaluate and 
assess pay justice by comparing their contributions (input) and compensation (output) 
to that of others, denoted as referents. The literature shows a strong link between pay 
satisfaction and distributive justice perceptions (Blau, 1994; Summers & Hendrix, 
1991; Sweeney, 1990; Tremblay et al., 2000), albeit varying in strength based on the 
class or relational hierarchy of the referents (Blau, 1994; Summers & DeNisi, 1990; 
Tayler & Vest, 1992). Perceptions of justice with regards to pay, be it the employee’s 
personal view as well as when compared to referent others, have consequences on 
how the employee views both the organisation that they work for, the executives 
(leadership) who run the organisation as well as the greater industrial sector that they 
operate in (Tremblay et al., 2000). Based on the fairness literature, distributive justice 
explains whether employees will judge their pay as fair if they feel that their pay-to-
effort ration equals that of referent others (Hartmann & Slapničar, 2012; Konovsky, 
2000; Wade, O’Reilly, & Pollock, 2006). Yet very little research has been done in 
order to investigate the justice relationship between employee’s perceptions of fair 
pay and bonuses, when the referent group is that of executive management of the 
organisation that they currently work for, when there is a performance metric 
associated with said executive remuneration, particularly relating to bonuses. 
Based on literature utilising fairness heuristic theory, with is focused on how 
individuals react to outcomes of their dealings with authorities and institutions and 
makes predictions in terms of the relationship between perceived fairness procedures 
(procedural justice), perceived fairness of outcomes (distributive justice) and 
acceptance of outcomes (Van den Bos, Lind, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997; Van den Bos, 
Wilke, & Lind, 1997). Hartmann and Slapničar (2012) state these two concepts of 
justice are intrinsically different and therefore will have different implications on the 
remuneration system fairness and an organisation’s ability to design and operate pay 
systems and structures. Pay transparency, would as indicated in the literature 
moderate these relationships. This moderation would be moderated by the extent to 
which employees are familiar with each other’s pay levels (Hartmann & Slapničar, 
2012). In a scenario where executives are involved, both their basic salaries, bonuses 
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as well as company performance metrics such as ROE are disclosed both in annual 
reports and financial as well as in the media, one could argue that there is indeed a 
high level of pay transparency. While pay transparency is an important factor in 
present discussions relating to pay fairness and the enhancement of pay justice, it has 
received very little attention empirically in the performance evaluation and justice 
literature (Collela, Paetzold, Zardkoohi, & Wesson, 2007; Hartmann & Slapničar, 
2012; Lau & Moser, 2008). Based on fairness heuristic theory, Hartmann and 
Slapničar (2012) predict that when managers know and are aware of each other’s pay 
relating to basic salary and bonuses, they are then able to compare each other’s pay-
to-effort ratios, thus meaning that distributive justice relatively more important in 
terms of employee motivation as well as other critical organisational issues.  The 
corollary of the above is that managers who do not know each other’s pay levels and 
as a consequence are unable to, through the use of equity theory, judge and perceive 
distributive justice in the situation will defer to the procedures (procedural justice) in 
determining how other manager’s performance and pay is determined. Expanding on 
Hartmann and Slapničar's (2012) premise, employee’s that are both aware and 
cognisant of what other employee’s earn as well as what executive’s in their 
organisation earn  and perceive this remuneration to be fair, they will show increased 
affective motivation toward their job as well as the organisation. The above rationale 
is in line with studies spanning across industries and organisational levels whereby 
employees who feel that they the outcomes that they have received in terms of 
remuneration as well as how they have been treated by the organisation, their 
superiors and colleagues leads to a working environment whereby employees are 
motivated and perform better due to their perception of a fair work environment 
(Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Mg, 2001; Colquitt, 2001a; Cropanzano, Byrne, 
Bobocel, & Rupp, 2001).  
This is reinforced further in Ambrose and Cropanzano's (2003) longitudinal study on 
fairness which demonstrates the relative importance of both procedural and 
distributive fairness in predicting work motivation, job satisfaction, organisational 
commitment as well as turnover intentions. Procedural justice had a positive effect on 
the above job-related attitudes and takes place immediately or shortly after a relevant 
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organisational decision has been made, while distributive justice and job-related 
attitudes continue and persist over a period of time and is a far better representation of 
an employee’s perceptions of (un)fairness of an organisation in terms of pay 
distribution, particularly those of executives when performance measures such as 
ROE (Ambrose & Cropanzano, 2003; Hartmann & Slapničar, 2012). The above is 
consistent with fairness heuristic theory and demonstrates the relative dominance and 
importance that procedural and distributive justice can play dependent on the 
organisational context of the situation. The theory further states that employee’s 
justice judgements or perceptions of fairness are determined by the relative amount of 
information that these individuals have in terms of procedures and distributions, in 
this case metrics utilised in determining salaries and bonuses in line with performance 
metrics and the actual remuneration packages paid, respectively (Hartmann & 
Slapničar, 2012; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Fairness heuristic theory considers employees 
formation of perceptions of fairness as a coping mechanism, which when applied 
reduces fears of exploitation by the organisations, or its members, specifically 
company executives ((Diekmann, Barsness, & Sodnak, 2004; Hartmann & Slapničar, 
2012). 
As indicated in the literature as well as in the above review, the constructs of 
procedural and distributive justice are strongly related, both conceptually and 
empirically (Schreurs, Guenter, Schumacher, Van Emmerik, & Notelaers, 2013; M.L. 
Williams et al., 2006). The proposed research will investigate perceptions of fairness 
of employees in the financial services industry in terms of executive remuneration and 
company performance, which is the distributive component of organisational justice. 
This investigation relates to the questions that equity theory framework ask when an 
individual compares their inputs to their received outputs and makes a comparison to 
a referent other or group of referent others. This perception is what is to be 
investigated, as a hypothesised difference should exist between a scenario where 
executives receive high remuneration packages while company performance is low 
and a scenario where executives receive low remuneration and company performance 




Statement of the Research Problem and Resultant Research Question 
As discussed above, a large body of academic literature has been amassed with 
regards to the relationship between executive remuneration and company 
performance. Yet to date, no research has investigated employee’s perceptions of 
fairness in terms of executive remuneration and its relationship to company 
performance. These perceptions may have wide ranging implications in the context of 
the organisations that these employees work in. As such the main aim of the current 
research was to address the research question below.  
Does executive remuneration, consisting of basic salary and short-term incentive 
bonuses, when presented to participants with a company performance metric, effect 
their perception of fairness with regards the scenario? 
Based on this research question, a proposed hypothesis is also suggested below. 
 
Hypothesis 
H₁: Executive remuneration (basic salary and short term incentive bonuses) and 
company performance have a significant main effect on employee’s perception of 





CHAPTER 3  
METHOD 
 
This chapter will focus on the methods employed within the current study to address 
and attempt to answer the research question. The research approach and motivation 
for the research design will also be discussed. Details in terms of the measuring 
instruments, company data, the research sampling process, as well as the data 
collection process and procedure will also be described and discussed. Furthermore, 
the statistical analysis methods will be defined with specific emphasis and details of 
the descriptive statistics and full factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA). 
 
Research Design 
A 2³ (i.e. 2x2x2) full-factorial experimental design was employed to investigate the 
extent to which perceptions of fairness are influenced when manipulating company 
performance and executive remuneration levels. Participants, obtained from a 
convenience sample of employees that work in the financial services industry, were 
randomly assigned to the eight experimental conditions. The eight experimental 
conditions were generated by means of creating combinations of two levels of 
company performance (low return on equity vs. high return on equity); two levels of 
executive fixed salary (low salary vs. high salary); and two levels of executive STIBs 
(low bonus vs. high bonus). 
The present study could be described as a field experiment, which involved the 
manipulation of a naturally occurring context in order to bring about and measure 
relevant exogenous variations, specificaly relating to perceptions of fairness. 
Participants in the present study took part in an experiment outside of a laboratory 
environment and as such the experiment was not confined to the stringent and specific 
environmental controls required for an laboratory experiment. In a field experiment 
there is less researcher control due to the context and environment being independent 
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of the researcher’s control. The full-factorial experimental design employed here, 
however, does allow for the manipulation of the variables that were proposed to 
influence the perceptions of fairness, namely executive basic salary, short term 
incentive bonuses (STIBs) and return on equity by controlling the stimuli content of 
the group that each participant was randomly assigned to. 
 
Validity 
The validity of an experiment is focused on whether a particular conclusion, outcome 
or inference is a fair and accurate approximation in relation and reference to the true 
conclusion, outcome or inference (Roe & Just, 2009). A field experiment’s relative 
internal validity is generally categorised as being medium to high. With regards to the 
present study, the internal validity was believed to be high due to the content of the 
variables being extracted and analysed from factual financial data, as well as the 
controlled environment that the surveys were administered in, utilising Qualtrics.  
Typical threats to the internal validity of an experimental study are: 
1. History threat – where extraneous or historical events cause the observed 
effect rather than the intervention. 
2. Maturation threat – that the natural maturation of the participants possibly 
caused the observed effects rather than the observed intervention. 
3. Testing threat – occurs most often in pre-post tests designs where the 
participants’ post-test responses are conditioned by their pre-test responses. 
4. Instrumentation threat – refers to the possibility that changes in administered 
tests are due to differences between pre-test and post-test scores. 
5. Mortality threat – the possibility that participants may be dropping out of the 
study at differential rates between the treatments and control groups. 
6. Regression threat – the statistical tendency of a group’s overall performance 
on a measure or a number of measures during a post-test to regress towards the 
mean of that measures rather than the anticipated direction.  
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Threats to the internal validity of this study can be attributed to history, selection and 
mortality threats. In terms of history threat, participants may have been exposed to 
executive remuneration models at the time of participating in the study, either through 
for example, serving on an executive remuneration committee or by being an 
executive themselves. This may have affected their perceptions of fairness in terms of 
executive remuneration when evaluated against company performance. For example, 
if a participant is currently an executive at an organization, they may perceive high 
executive base pay, high executive STIBs and low company performance to be fair if 
they have been subject to this type of performance based remuneration structure 
themselves. Selection may have also posed a threat to the study due to the selection 
process not being random and containing systematic bias. This was mitigated by 
random assignment (randomisation) of participants to the various experimental stimuli 
groups, thereby decreasing systematic bias. However, due to the convenience 
sampling of the participants the selection sample may not be an adequate 
representation of the target population. Mortality may have been a threat to the study 
as participants who began the survey, but dropped out or did not complete the survey 
may have affected the nature of the group of participants being tested. An example 
would be if participants who are senior or top level management at organisations had 
higher mortality rates than participants who were employed and operated at lower 
managerial levels, it may have affected the perception of fairness views being 
recorded from the participant sample as it would be more focused on specific 
employee groups (Salkind, 2009). 
External validity of an experiment refers to the ability to generalise the relationships 
and difference found in a study to other people, settings and contexts (Roe & Just, 
2009). External validity was required in order to be able to generalise the results of 
this study. The external validity of a field experiment is categorised as medium to 
high (Roe & Just, 2009). While this study is more likely to have low to medium levels 
of external validity due to the manner in which the sample was obtained i.e. due to 
non-probability convenience sampling. On the other hand, real world executive 
remuneration and company performance data was utilised in each of the stimuli 




De Goede (2007) states that is not always practical or even possible to obtain data 
from every subject in a target population, represented as N, thus a more viable and 
practical means to collect data is to select a representative sample, represented as n, of 
the target population. The extent to which observations can be generalised to the 
target population is a function of the number of participants in the selected sample and 
as a consequence how representative the sample is, thus the influence of the power of 
inferential statistics tests is dependent on sample size (Elmes & Kantowitz, 1999). 
The target population that the sample was derived from was employees working 
within the financial services industry in South Africa. For the purposes of this study 
any employee working with a financial services organisation or group of companies 
could have participated in the research, irrespective of their individual function within 
the organisation or group, for example in human resources, finance or compliance. 
This population and sample by definition are knowledge workers. Knowledge workers 
are individuals who gain access to jobs through formal education and who carry and 
own knowledge as a powerful resource, which they own rather than the organisation 
(Drucker, 2002).  
Sample size. 
When conducting a full-factorial design, as with any factorial design, the required 
sample size is dictated by the number of conditions present. With eight condition or 
stimuli groups being present, the minimum number of participants suggested is 20, 
while the ideal number being 30 participants per condition (Simmons, Nelson, & 
Simonsohn, 2011). Based on these rules-of-thumb the minimum sample size required 
was 160 participants, with the ideal sample size being 240 participants. Despite 
attempts to obtain more respondents, the sample size that was acquired for this 
research was 97 participants. None of the stimuli groups met the minimum of 20 
participants per condition i.e. the minimum sample size requirements were not met. 




The determination of an ideal sample size remains critical for statistical power 
analysis purposes. Power analysis refers to the determination of both Type I and Type 
II errors. It is vital that these errors are not made during hypothesis testing with 
regards to the applicable sample size. Type I errors relate to the incorrect rejection of 
a null hypothesis. Type I errors can be controlled by the significance level selected 
where α is the maximum probability that there would be a Type I error. A Type II 
error occurs when there is failure to reject an incorrect null hypothesis. Due to the 
relativly small sample obtained, there is limited statistical power and as such 
inferences should be treated with the neccessary caution. 
 
Participants 
A convenience (non-probability) sampling approach was used in order to maximise 
the participant response rate, while accomodating the researcher’s logistical and 
financial constraints. The request to participate in the study was distributed 
electronically to employees, peers, colleagues and family members working within 
South African financial services organisation, predominantly based in either Cape 
Town or Johannesburg. The request was also distributed to members of the South 
African Rewards Association (SARA). In total 170 responses were collected, of 
which 97 had sufficient responses for data analysis.  
The ages of the participants ranged from 22 to 66 years (M=36.7 years, SD=11 years, 
n=97). In terms of gender the sample consisted of 59 males (60.8%), 35 females 
(36.1%), where 1 (1%) participant preferred not to answer and 2 (2.1%) participants 
did not answer the question.  
In terms of participants of designated racial groups, 2 were black (2.1%), 74 were 
white (76.3%), 6 were coloured (6.2%), 9 were coloured (9.3%), 4 preferred not to 
answer (4.1%) and 2 (2.1%) did not answer the question. Participant’s primary 
languages ranged from Afrikaans (n=30, 30.9%), English (n=63, 64.9%), Zulu (n=1; 
1%), Xhosa (n=1, 1%). The above racial and primary language demographics are not 
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representative of the South African population and have draws upon a participant 
sample group that is predominantly English and Afrikaans white employees working 
in the financial services industry. 
In terms of qualfications, 17 participants (17.5%) held a matric qualification, 32 
(33%) held undergraduate degrees or diplomas, 37 (38.1%) held honours or 
postgraduate diplomas and 9 (9.3%) held Masters degrees, with 2 (2.1%) not 
completing the question. This is line with the population of South African financial 
services, as entrance and hiring criteria oftens requires a bachelors or undergraduate 
degree. 
With regards to the specific sector of the financial services industry, 3 participants 
(3.1%) worked in a commercial banking environment, 5 (5.2%) in an investment 
banking environment, 1 (1%) in foreign exchange, 30 (30.9%) in investments, 12 
(12.4%) in insurance and 44 (45.4%) in financial advisory, intermediary or 
administrative services, with 2 (2.1%) not completing the question. The bulk of the 
financial services industry, in line with the above descriptives, provides advisory, 
intermediary or administrative services to clients, with other sectors employing 
markedly less employees in more specialist functions.  
In terms of the levels of management that respondents found themselves in, 10 
participants (10.3%) defined their level of management within their current 
organisation as top management, 17 (17.5%) as senior management, 37 (38.1%) as 
middle management or professionally skilled staff member, 24 (24.7%) as junior 
management or academically qualified staff member, while 7 (7.2%) defined 
themselves as semi-skilled. 2 (2.1%) did not complete the question. 
In terms of current employment status, 82 participants (84.5%) were permanently 
employed, 7 (7.2%) were on fixed-term employment contracts and 6 (6.2%) were self-
employed, with 2 participants (2.1%) not completing the question.  
When considering the size of the organisation from which respondents came, 9 
participants (9.3%) were employed in micro-sized organisations (1-10 employees), 5 
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(5.2%) in small sized organisations (11-50 employees), 49 (50.5%) in medium sized 
organisations and 32 (33%), with 2 participants (2.1%) not completing the question. 
The average number of years of employment for those currently employed was 5.23 
years (SD=5.04). The minimum number of years of employment was under one year 
with the maximum being over 20 years.    
 
Annual Financial Statement Data 
The executive remuneration and company performance data that was utilised in order 
to construct the stimuli was extracted from audited and publicly available Annual 
Reports, Annual Financial Statements or Annual Income Reports, hereafter jointly 
referred to as Annual Reports. 
Selection criteria. 
In the present study the perceptions of fairness of employees in the South African 
financial services industry, in terms of executive remuneration and company 
performance, was investigated. The remuneration data that formed part of the stimuli 
for the experiment was extracted from listed financial services organisations on the 
JSE, specficlaly those companies that are within the top 100 listed companies as 
determined by market capitalisation. 
Financial services organisations, for the purposes of this study’s selection criteria, 
were defined as any company that provides financial services to individuals, 
corporates or other organisations. The provision of financial services needs to be the 
company’s primary focus and range from (but not limited to) commercial or 
investment banking, foreign exchange, investments, insurance to financial advisory, 
intermediary or administrative services. 
Based on the above selection criteria and based on a market capitalisation report 
generated on 13 June 2014, 27 listed financial services organisation fitted the defined 
criteria (BFA McGregor, 2014). 
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These qualifying organisations Annual Reports were then sourced from their 
respective websites in order for the organisation’s executive remuneration data to be 
found and recorded for further analysis. Annual Reports for the organisation’s 2013 
fiscal year were utilised. Company performance metrics with regards to Return on 
Equity (ROE) for the 2013 period was calculated utilising these Annual Reports (BFA 
McGregor, 2014). 
Criteria utilised for executive remuneration data collection and calculations included 
all executive directors and prescribed officers, collectively referred to as executive 
directors, but excluded non-executive directors. The term director has been defined in 
law by the Companies Act of 2008, which defines a director as “A member of the 
board of a company…, or an alternative director of a company and includes any 
person occupying the position of director or alternate director, by whatever name 
designated” (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited, 2013, p. 9). While a prescribed 
officer includes any person employed by the organisation, by whatever title they are 
designated that exercises general executive control over and management of the 
whole, or a significant portion of the business and activities of the organisation or 
regularly participates to a material degree in the exercise of general executive control 
over and management of the whole or a significant portion of the business and 
activities of the organisation (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited, 2013). While non-
executive directors are defined as directors that are not involved in the management of 
the company and are independent of management on all issues including strategy, 
performance and the evaluation thereof, sustainability, resources, transformation, 
diversity, employment equity as well as standards of conduct (Deloitte Touche 
Tohmatsu Limited, 2013). 
For the purposes of executive remuneration calculations, all executive directors and 
prescribed officers were included, irrespective if they resigned, were dismissed or 
passed away during their 2013 fiscal year. 
Any organisation’s Annual Report that was stated and reported in Pounds Sterling 
(GBP / £) was converted to South African Rand (ZAR) using the conversion rate of   
1 : 17.2954 as at 31/12/2013 (South African Reserve Bank, 2014). 
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Should an executive director not earn or have not been paid a STIB in the reported 
period then the average STIB remuneration for the other executive directors in the 
organisation was applied. If there was only one executive director in the organisation 
then the average STIB remuneration per executive for all organisations fitting the 
selection criteria was applied. 
The relevant data, as described above, was then extracted from Annual Reports with 
the descriptive data being generated, specifically the average, minimum and 
maximum values of executive basic salaries, STIBs and ROE as well as the 25th, 50th 
and 75th percentile values. 
The financial services organisations that fitted the initial selection criteria (Table 3.1) 
and the descriptive data relating to the organisations that fitted final selection criteria 




JSE Listed Top 100 Financial Services Organisation Fitting Initial Selection Criteria 























10 Standard Bank Group Ltd. SBK 231 463 0.0222 6 R 33 476 000 R 5 579 333 R 40 908 000 R 6 818 000 12.57% 
11 FirstRand Ltd. FSR 219 085 0.021 5 R 26 958 000 R 5 391 600 R 51 420 000 R 10 284 000 20.14% 
13 Old Mutual plc OML 172 129 0.0165 2 R 36 372 226 R 18 186 113 R 32 671 011 R 16 335 505 8.58% 
15 Barclays Africa Group Ltd. BGA 131 401 0.0126 5 R 23 409 001 R 4 681 800 R 48 400 000 R 9 680 000 18.25% 
18 Sanlam Ltd. SLM 118 874 0.0114 4 R 13 788 000 R 3 447 000 R 10 666 667 R 2 666 667 19.85% 
20 Nedbank Group Ltd. NED 112 536 0.0108 7 R 29 006 000 R 4 143 714 R 34 800 000 R 4 971 429 14.25% 
26 RMB Holdings Ltd. RMH 70 670 0.0068 1 R 8 500 000 R 8 500 000 R 5 930 656 R 5 930 656 16.95% 
31 Investec plc INP 54 356 0.0052 4 R 29 573 318 R 7 393 329 R 53 269 832 R 13 317 458 0% 
32 Discovery Ltd. DSY 53 472 0.0051 9 R 46 248 000 R 5 138 667 R 42 196 000 R 4 688 444 15.96% 
35 Growthpoint Properties Ltd. GRT 52 073 0.005 Excluded from further analysis. See description of company for details. 
36 Intu Properties plc ITU 49 666 0.0048 3 R 28 744 955 R 9 581 652 R 16 759 243 R 5 586 414 9.43% 
37 Reinet Investments SCA REI 47 810m 0.0046 Excluded from further analysis. See description of company for details. 
38 Capital & Counties Properties PLC CCO 46 081 0.0044 4 R 27 283 736 R 6 820 934 R 42 406 015 R 10 601 504 16.47% 
41 
Rand Merchant Insurance Holdings 
Ltd. 
RMI 42 803 0.0041 1 R 5 454 000 R 5 454 000 R 5 930 656 R 5 930 656 16.32% 
47 Coronation Fund Managers Ltd. CML 34 679 0.0033 3 R 2 783 000 R 927 667 R 17 208 000 R 5 736 000 72.64% 
50 Redefine Properties Ltd. RDF 30 648 0.0029 7 R 15 216 000 R 2 173 714 R 8 608 000 R 1 229 714 18.25% 
60 Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd. CPI 24 318 0.0023 3 R 16 483 000 R 5 494 333 R 163 000 R 54 333 19.19% 
62 Santam Ltd. SNT 23 220 0.0022 3 R 8 835 000 R 2 945 000 R 3 900 000 R 1 300 000 18.26% 
66 PSG Group Ltd. PSG 21 152 0.002 3 R 6 960 000 R 2 320 000 R 8 390 000 R 2 796 667 19.03% 
70 Hyprop Investments Ltd. HYP 18 558 0.0018 2 R 2 539 000 R 1 269 500 R 2 075 000 R 1 037 500 69.17% 
75 African Bank Investments Ltd. ABL 17 072 0.0016 9 R 19 779 000 R 3 296 500 R 35 583 938 R 5 930 656 -49.42% 
76 
Resilient Property Income Fund 
Ltd. 
RES 16 926 0.0016 Excluded from further analysis. See description of company for details. 
77 Capital Property Fund Ltd. CPL 16 793 0.0016 Excluded from further analysis. See description of company for details. 
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86 Attacq Ltd. ATT 13 128 0.0013 Excluded from further analysis. See description of company for details. 
90 Redefine International P.L.C. RPL 12 157 0.0012 Excluded from further analysis. See description of company for details. 
99 Invicta Holdings Ltd. IVT 9 801 0.0009 4 R 10 558 000 R 2 639 500 R 8 000 000 R 2 000 000 35.73% 
 
Table 3.2: 
Descriptive Date for JSE Listed Top 100 Financial Services Organisations Executives Fitting Final Selection Criteria 
 Minimum Maximum Average 25th Percentile 50th Percentile 75th Percentile 
 
Total Basic Remuneration 
Per Annum 
 
R 927 666 R 18 186 113 R 5 269 217 R 2 868 625 R 4 910 233 R 5 889 733 
 
Total STIB Remuneration 
Per Annum 
 
R 54 333 R 16 335 505 R 5 844 780 R 2 731 667 R 5 661 207 R 7 533 500 
 
Return on Equity (ROE) 
for 2013 Fiscal Year 
 




Description of companies. 
Descriptions of the organisations fitting initial selection criteria outlining the nature of 
each business, main sector within financial services that they operate in, number of 
employees, executive directors and prescribed officers as well as executive 
remuneration and company performance metrics (where applicable) are presented 
below. 
Standard Bank Group Ltd. (SBK). 
Nature of Business – Standard Bank is a South African-based financial services 
group with a global presence focused on emerging markets. It operates from 18 
countries in Africa and from 16 countries on other continents, including key financial 
centres of Europe, the Americas and Asia (Profile Data, 2014). 
Sector – Fins-Banks-Banks-Banks. 
Number of Employees – 52 000. 
Executive Directors & Prescribed Officers – Executive Directors – BJ Kruger, SK 
Tshabalala, SP Ridley, JH Maree (former), PG Wharton-Hood (former). Prescribed 
Officers – JB Hemphill. Total number of executives – 6. 
Executive Remuneration and Company Performance Metrics – Average basic 
salary per annum - R 5 579 333; Average STIB per annum - R 6 818 000; ROE for 
organisations - 12.57%. 
FirstRand Ltd. (FSR). 
Nature of Business – Listed on the JSE, FirstRand Ltd. is one of the largest financial 
institutions in South Africa (Profile Data, 2014). 
Sector – Fins-Banks-Banks-Banks. 
Number of Employees – 37 231. 
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Executive Directors & Prescribed Officers – Executive Directors – D Premnarayen; 
Prescribed Officers – SE Nxasana, JP Burger, M Jordaan, A Pullinger. Total number 
of executives – 5. 
Executive Remuneration and Company Performance Metrics - Average basic 
salary per annum - R 5 391 600; Average STIB per annum - R 10 284 000; ROE for 
organisation - 20.14%. 
Old Mutual PLC (OML). 
Nature of Business – Old Mutual provides life assurance, asset management, banking 
and general insurance to more than 14 million customers in Africa, the Americas, 
Asia and Europe. Originating in South Africa in 1845, Old Mutual has been listed on 
the London and Johannesburg Stock Exchanges, amongst others, since 1999. In the 
year ended 31 December 2012, the Group reported adjusted operating profit before 
tax of GBP 1.6 billion (on an IFRS basis) and had GBP 262 billion of funds under 
management from core operations (Profile Data, 2014). 
Sector – Fins-Insurance-Life Insurance-Life Insurance. 
Number of Employees – 54 368. 
Executive Directors & Prescribed Officers – Executive Directors – J Roberts, P 
Broadley. Prescribed Officers – N/A. Total number of executives – 2. 
Executive Remuneration and Company Performance Metrics - Average basic 
salary per annum - R 18 186 113; Average STIB per annum - R 16 335 505; ROE for 
organisation - 8.58%. Basic salary and STIBs converted from Pounds Sterling (GBP / 
£) to South African Rand (ZAR). 
Barclays South Africa Group Ltd (BGA). 
Nature of Business – Barclays Africa offer a comprehensive range of banking 
services, bank assurance and wealth management products and services (Profile Data, 
2014). 
Sector – Fins-Banks-Banks-Banks. 
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Number of Employees – 35 200. 
Executive Directors & Prescribed Officers – Executive Directors – M Ramos, D 
Hodnett, C Bond, S van Coller, W Lategan. Total number of executives – 5.  
Executive Remuneration and Company Performance Metrics - Average basic 
salary per annum - R 4 681 800; Average STIB per annum - R 9 680 000; ROE for 
organisation - 18.25%. 
Sanlam Ltd. (SLM). 
Nature of Business – Sanlam is a  leading financial services group in South Africa 
with its head office in Belville. Established in 1918, the group demutualised in 1998 
and Sanlam Ltd. then listed on the JSE Ltd. in Johannesburg and Namibian Stock 
Exchange (Profile Data, 2014). 
Sector – Fins-Insurance-Life Insurance-Life Insurance. 
Number of Employees – 12 953. 
Executive Directors & Prescribed Officers – Executive Directors – J van Zyl, K 
Möller, T Mvusi, Y Ramiah. Total number of executives – 5. 
Executive Remuneration and Company Performance Metrics - Average basic 
salary per annum - R 3 447 000; Average STIB per annum - R 2 666 667; ROE for 
organisation - 19.85%. J van Zyl not baid STIB as per Group CEO remuneration 
package. 
Nedbank Group Ltd. (NED). 
Nature of Business – Nedbank Group Ltd. (‘Nedbank Group’) is a bank holding 
company, with its principal banking subsidiary being Nedbank Ltd. The company’s 
ordinary shares have been listed on JSE Ltd. since 1969 and on the Namibian Stock 
Exchange since 2007 (Profile Data, 2014). 
Sector – Fins-Banks-Banks-Banks. 
Number of Employees – 29 513. 
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Executive Directors & Prescribed Officers – Executive Directors – MWT Brown, 
GW Dempster, RK Morathi. Prescribed Officers – IG Johnson, B Kennedy, D 
Macready, MC Nkuhlu. Total number of executives – 7. 
Executive Remuneration and Company Performance Metrics - Average basic 
salary per annum - R 4 143 714; Average STIB per annum - R 4 971 429; ROE for 
organisation - 14.25%. 
RMB Holdings Ltd. (RMH). 
Nature of Business – RMB Holdings Ltd. is a diversified financial services holding 
company listed on the JSE Ltd. (“JSE”) under the banking sector. Its investments 
include FirstRand Ltd (Profile Data, 2014). 
Sector – Fins-Banks-Banks-Banks. 
Number of Employees – 2. 
Executive Directors & Prescribed Officers – Executive Directors – P Cooper. Total 
number of executives – 1. 
Executive Remuneration and Company Performance Metrics - Average basic 
salary per annum - R 8 500 000; Average STIB per annum - R 5 930 656; ROE for 
organisation - 16.95%. P Cooper not paid STIB as per Group CEO remuneration 
package. 
Investec PLC (INP). 
Nature of Business – Investec is an international, specialist bank and asset manager 
that provides a diverse range of financial products and services to a niche client base 
in three principal markets, the United Kingdom, South Africa, and Australia as well as 
certain other countries. Investec PLC is the controlling company of the majority of the 
group’s non Southern-African operations (Profile Data, 2014). 
Sector – Fins-Financial Srvcs-Gen Financial-Investment Srvcs. 
Number of Employees – 7 575. 
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Executive Directors & Prescribed Officers – Executive directors – S Koseff, B 
Kantor, GR Burger, HJ du Toit. Total number of executives – 4. 
Executive Remuneration and Company Performance Metrics - Average basic 
salary per annum - R 7 393 329; Average STIB per annum - R 13 317 458; ROE for 
organisations - 0.00%. Basic salary and STIBs converted from Pounds Sterling (GBP 
/ £) to South African Rand (ZAR). 
Discovery Ltd. (DSY). 
Nature of Business – Discovery operates in the healthcare cover and life assurance 
markets in South Africa and the United Kingdom (UK), and in the South African 
long-term savings and financial services market, as well as the short-term insurance 
market (Profile Data, 2014). 
Sector – Fins-Insurance-Life Insurance-Life Insurance. 
Number of Employees – 6 974. 
Executive Directors & Prescribed Officers – Executive Directors – A Gore, R 
Farber, H Kallner, NS Koopowitz, HP Mayers, A Ntsabula, A Pollard, JM Robertson, 
B Swartberg. Total number of executives – 9.  
Executive Remuneration and Company Performance Metrics – Average basic 
salary per annum - R 5 138 667; Average STIB per annum - R 4 688 444; ROE for 
organisations - 15.96%. 
Growthpoint Properties Ltd. (GRT). 
Nature of Business – Growthpoint is a property investment holding company whose 
linked units comprising shares and variable rate debentures, are listed on the JSE Ltd. 
under “Real Estate” (Profile Data, 2014). 
Sector – Fins-Rest-Inv-Dev. 
Number of Employees – 457. 
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Executive Directors & Prescribed Officers – Executive Directors – LN Sasse, EK 
de Klerk, SM Snowball, G Völkel. Total number of executives – 4. 
Executive Remuneration and Company Performance Metrics – Average basic 
salary per annum - R 2 275 319; Average STIB per annum - R 3 833 333; ROE for 
organisations - -483.65%. Excluded from final organisation selection due to the 
extremely negative ROE ratio which would have skewed the average ROE. 
Intu Properties PLC (ITU). 
Nature of Business – Intu Properties PLC is one of the UK’s largest listed property 
companies and a constituent of the FTSE-100 Index of the UK’s leading listed 
companies. Capeshop converted into a UK Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) on 
January 2007 (Profile Data, 2014). 
Sector – Fins-Rest-Inv-Ret. 
Number of Employees – 228. 
Executive Directors & Prescribed Officers – Executive Directors – D Fischel, M 
Roberts, P Burgess. Total number of executives – 3. 
Executive Remuneration and Company Performance Metrics - Average basic 
salary per annum - R 9 581 652; Average STIB per annum - R 5 586 414; ROE for 
organisations - 9.43%. Basic salary and STIBs converted from Pounds Sterling (GBP 
/ £) to South African Rand (ZAR). 
Reinet Investments SCA (REI). 
Nature of Business – Reinet was established on 21 October 2008 when the former 
Richemont SA changed its legal form to that of a partnership limited by shares and 
adopted the name Reinet Investments S.C.A. At the same time as it changed its legal 
status, Richemont SA redeemd its ordinary capital, which was held exclusively, by 
Compagnie Financière Richemont S.A (“CFR”) by way of the distribution to CFR of 
its entire luxury goods interests. In consequence, CFR became a specifically focused 
luxury goods company and Reinet was established as an investment vehicle, the 
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principal asset of which was the former Richemont’s interest in British American 
Tobacco (Profile Data, 2014). 
Sector – Fins-Investment Instruments-Equities-Equities. 
Number of Employees – 12. 
Executive Directors & Prescribed Officers – Executive Directors – J Malherbe, E 
Michotte, F Mostert, JP Rupert, JA Grieve, D Longden. Total number of executives – 
6. 
Executive Remuneration and Company Performance Metrics – No further 
analysis done, as due the organisations structure and shareholding all executives are 
remunerated in terms of direct and indirect holdings which either held directly by the 
respective executive or indirectly via a third party intermediary. As such executive 
remuneration cannot be calculated using the Annual Report. 
Capital & Counties Properties PLC (CCO). 
Nature of Business – The group has a concentration of assets in three landmark 
estates for substantial active asset management to drive superior total returns for 
shareholders (Profile Data, 2014) 
Sector – Fins-Financial Srvcs-Real Estate-Hldgs&Development. 
Number of Employees – 326. 
Executive Directors & Prescribed Officers – Executive Directors – I Durant, I 
Hawksworth, S Das, G Yardley. Total number of executives – 4. 
Executive Remuneration and Company Performance Metrics - Average basic 
salary per annum - R 6 820 934; Average STIB per annum - R 10 601 504; ROE for 
organisations - 16.47%. Basic salary and STIBs converted from Pounds Sterling 
(GBP / £) to South African Rand (ZAR). I Durant not paid STIB as per Group CEO 
remuneration package. 
Rand Merchant Insurance Holdings Ltd. (RMI). 
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Nature of Business – RMI Holdings is a listed, insurance-focused investment entity 
comprising an investment portfolio of South Africa’s premier insurance brands. In 
December 2012, RMI Holdings acquired an additional 825 000 ordinary shares in 
MMI Holdings Ltd. for cash consideration of R17 millions. This resulted in an 
increase of RMI Holdings’ investment in MMI Holdings Ltd. from 24.94% to 25% 
(Profile Data, 2014). 
Sector – Fins-Investment Instruments-Equities-Equities. 
Number of Employees – 0. 
Executive Directors & Prescribed Officers – Executive Directors – P Cooper. Total 
number of executives – 1. 
Executive Remuneration and Company Performance Metrics - Average basic 
salary per annum - R 5 454 000; Average STIB per annum - R 5 930 656; ROE for 
organisations - 16.32%. 
Coronation Fund Managers Ltd. (CML). 
Nature of Business – Coronation Fund Managers Ltd. is one of Southern Africa’s 
most successful third-party fund management companies. It is a pure fund 
management business which offers both individual and institutional investors access 
to local and global expertise across all asset classes, including specialist Global 
Emerging Markets, Africa and Private Equity units (Profile Data, 2014). 
Sector – Fins-Financial Srvcs-Gen Financial-Asset Managers. 
Number of Employees – 246. 
Executive Directors & Prescribed Officers – Executive Directors – H Nelson, A 
Pillay, J Snalam. Total number of executives – 3. 
Executive Remuneration and Company Performance Metrics - Average basic 
salary per annum - R 927 667; Average STIB per annum - R 5 736 000; ROE for 
organisations - 72.64%. 
Redefine Properties Ltd. (RDF). 
55 
 
Nature of Business – Redefine Ltd. is a Property Loan Stock company listed on the 
JSE, has a market capitalisation of R30 billion and directly manages a diversified 
portfolio of property assets in excess of R41 billion. The company is diversified 
through its holdings in JSE listed Redefine Properties International Ltd (Profile Data, 
2014). 
Sector – Fins-Rest-Inv-Div. 
Number of Employees – 291. 
Executive Directors & Prescribed Officers – Executive Directors – AJ Konig, DH 
Rice, M Wainer. Prescribed Officers – Prescribed Officer A, Prescribed Officer B, 
Prescribed Officer C, Prescribed Officer D. Annual Reports do not disclose the names 
of the prescribed officers. Total number of executives – 7. 
Executive Remuneration and Company Performance Metrics - Average basic 
salary per annum - R 2 173 714; Average STIB per annum - R 1 229 714; ROE for 
organisations - 18.25%. 
Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd. (CPI). 
Nature of Business – Capitec Bank, a retail bank, is a subsidiary of Capitec which is 
listed on the JSE Ltd. Capitec Bank provides a simplified and affordable banking 
facilities to clients via the innovative use of technology in a manner which is 
convenient and personalised (Profile Data, 2014).  
Sector – Fins-Banks-Banks-Banks. 
Number of Employees – 8 308. 
Executive Directors & Prescribed Officers – Executive Directors – AP du Plessis, 
GM Fourie, R Stassen. Total number of executives – 3. 
Executive Remuneration and Company Performance Metrics - Average basic 
salary per annum - R 5 494 333; Average STIB per annum - R 54 333; ROE for 
organisations - 19.19%. 
Santam Ltd. (SNT). 
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Nature of Business – Since Santam opened its doors on 1 May 1918 it showed 
determination, courage and commitment in becoming the largest and leading short-
term insurer in South Africa. Santam has managed to build a diverse company that 
stretches into all areas of general insurance, across personal, commercial and 
specialist markets (Profile Data, 2014). 
Sector – Fins-Insurance-Nonlife Insurance-Property&Casualty. 
Number of Employees – 4 944. 
Executive Directors & Prescribed Officers – Executive Directors – IM Kirk, HD 
Nel, Y Ramiah. Total number of executives – 3. 
Executive Remuneration and Company Performance Metrics - Average basic 
salary per annum - R 2 945 000; Average STIB per annum - R 1 300 000; ROE for 
organisations - 18.26%. 
PSG Group Ltd. (PSG). 
Nature of Business – The group, through its various subsidiaries and associated 
companies, offers diversified financial and other services (including financial advice, 
stockbroking, asset management, insurance, financing, banking, investing, corporate 
finance and education services)(Profile Data, 2014). 
Sector – Fins-Financial Srvcs-Gen Financial-Investment Srvcs. 
Number of Employees – 5 236. 
Executive Directors & Prescribed Officers – Executive Directors – WL Greeff, JA 
Holtzhausen, PJ Mouton. Total number of executives – 3. 
Executive Remuneration and Company Performance Metrics - Average basic 
salary per annum - R 2 320 000; Average STIB per annum - R 2 796 667; ROE for 
organisations - 19.03%. 
Hyprop Investments Ltd. (HYP). 
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Nature of Business – Hyprop is a professionally managed property company listed 
on the JSE, specialising in prime quality shopping centres. Hyprop provides investors 
with the opportunity to hold combined unites in quality retail real estate and 
distributes all its income on a semi-annual basis. The company further continues to 
grow portfolio through acquisitions and developments as and when appropriate 
opportunities arise (Profile Data, 2014). 
Sector – Fins-Rest-Inv-Ret. 
Number of Employees – 209. 
Executive Directors & Prescribed Officers – Executive Directors – P Prinsloo, L 
Cohen. Total number of executives – 2. 
Executive Remuneration and Company Performance Metrics - Average basic 
salary per annum - R 1 269 500; Average STIB per annum - R 1 037 500; ROE for 
organisations - 69.17%. 
African Bank Investments Ltd. (ABL). 
Nature of Business – ABIL is a publicly owned holding company listed on the JSE 
Ltd. with wholly owned subsidiaries primarily within the South African unsecured 
credit and furniture and appliances retailing environment. The group operates through 
primary businesses, African Bank and EHL, as well as insurance subsidiaries Stangen, 
Relyant Insurance and Relyant Life (Profile Data, 2014). 
Sector – Fins-Financial Srvcs-Gen Financial-Consumer Finance. 
Number of Employees - 13 180. 
Executive Directors & Prescribed Officers – Executive Directors – L Kirkinis, T 
Fourie, T Sokutu, N Nalliah, G Schachar. Prescribed Officers – C Chemel, G 
Roussos, J de Ridder, S Kahanovitz. Total number of executives – 9. 
Executive Remuneration and Company Performance Metrics - Average basic 
salary per annum - R 3 296 500; Average STIB per annum - R 5 930 656; ROE for 
organisations - -49.42%. 
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Resilient Property Income Fund Ltd. (RES). 
Nature of Business – Resilient Property Income Fund is a property loan stock 
company which has been listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange since December 
2002. The Fund is focused on the development of and investment in dominant retail 
centres in cities outside the metropolitan areas. Strict criteria are applied in evaluating 
target investments including presence of at least three national anchor tenants and 
major national retail groups occupying in excess of 70% of the lettable area. Regions 
not displaying sound long term growth prospects are avoided (Profile Data, 2014). 
Sector – Fins-Rest-Inv-Ret. 
Number of Employees – 0. 
Executive Directors & Prescribed Officers – Executive Directors – D De Beer, A 
de Lange, N Willem Hanekom, JJ Kriek. Total number of executives – 4. 
Executive Remuneration and Company Performance Metrics - No further 
analysis done, as due the organisations structure and shareholding all executives are 
remunerated in terms of direct and indirect holdings which either held directly by the 
respective executive or indirectly via a third party intermediary. As such executive 
remuneration cannot be calculated using the Annual Report. 
Capital Property Fund Ltd. (CPL). 
Nature of Business – Capital Property Fund is a Property Unit Trust (“PUT”) which 
was established in June 1984 in terms of the Unit Trust Control Act and is the oldest 
listed PUT (Profile Data, 2014). 
Sector – Fins-Rest-Inv-Ind. 
Number of Employees – 0. 
Executive Directors & Prescribed Officers – Executive Directors – B Stuhler, R 
Bornman, A de Lange, D Lewis, A Teixeira. Total number of executives – 5. 
Executive Remuneration and Company Performance Metrics - No further 
analysis done, as due the organisations structure and shareholding all executives are 
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remunerated in terms of direct and indirect holdings which either held directly by the 
respective executive or indirectly via a third party intermediary. As such executive 
remuneration cannot be calculated using the Annual Report. 
Attacq Ltd. (ATT). 
Nature of Business – Attacq is a leading South African capital growth fund in the 
real estate sector. It has consistently delivered growth in capital to its investors 
through strategic property holdings and developments. Attacq has grown gross assets 
to R13.5 billion with an initial gross asset value of R600 million as at 30 June 2005 
(Profile Data, 2014). 
Sector – Fins-Financial Srvcs-Real Estate-Hldgs&Development. 
Number of Employees – 0. 
Executive Directors & Prescribed Officers – M Wilken, L van der Watt, M 
Hamman. Total number of executives – 3. 
Executive Remuneration and Company Performance Metrics - No further 
analysis done, as due the organisations structure and shareholding all executives are 
remunerated in terms of direct and indirect holdings which either held directly by the 
respective executive or indirectly via a third party intermediary. As such executive 
remuneration cannot be calculated using the Annual Report. 
Redefine International PLC (RPL). 
Nature of Business – RI PLC is an income focused UK Real Estate Investment Trust 
with exposure to a broad range of properties and geographical area. The company has 
direct and indirect property investments geographically diversified across the UK, 
Germany, Switzerland, the Channel Islands, the Netherlands and Australia, providing 
exposure to the retail, office, industrial and hotel sectors (Profile Data, 2014). 
Sector – Fins-Rest-Inv-Div. 
Number of Employees - 0. 
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Executive Directors & Prescribed Officers – Executive Directors – A Rowell, MJ 
Watters, SJ Oakenfull. Total number of executives – 3. 
Executive Remuneration and Company Performance Metrics - No further 
analysis done, as due the organisations structure and shareholding all executives are 
remunerated in terms of direct and indirect holdings which either held directly by the 
respective executive or indirectly via a third party intermediary. As such executive 
remuneration cannot be calculated using the Annual Report. 
Invicta Holdings Ltd. (IVT). 
Nature of Business – Invicta Holdings Ltd. is an investment holding and 
management company, controlling and managing assets (Profile Data, 2014). 
Sector – Ind-Ind Goods&Srvcs-Ind Engineering-Ind Machinery. 
Number of Employees – 4 498. 
Executive Directors & Prescribed Officers – Executive Directors – AM Sinclair, 
CE Walters, CH Wiese, C Barnard, A Goldstone. 
Executive Remuneration and Company Performance Metrics - Average basic 
salary per annum - R 2 639 500; Average STIB per annum - R 2 000 000; ROE for 
organisations - 35.73%. 
 
Materials 
Eight scenarios were designed using executive remuneration and company 
performance data, extracted and analysed as per the selection ctriteria descibed above. 
The levels and combinations of executive remuneration, consisting of basic salary and 
STIBs, and company performance in terms of ROE were manipulated according to the 
design matrix illustrated in Table 3.3. In terms of executive’s basic salary or STIBs, 
“H” represents remuneration that is at the 75th percentile of the JSE data that fitted the 
defined criteria, while “L” represents remuneration that is at the 25th percentile of the 
market. For return on equity (ROE), “H” represents a return to shareholders that is at 
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the 75th percentile of the JSE data that fitted the defined criteria, while “L” represents 
ROE that is at the 25th percentile of the market. Due to the 2³ Factorial Design, the 
eight stimuli groups account for all possible combinations of each factor level with 
other factors (Dziak, Nahum-Shani, & Collins, 2012). 
 
Table 3.3: 








Return on Equity 
1 H H H 
2 H H L 
3 H L L 
4 L L L 
5 L L H 
6 L H H 
7 L H L 
8 H L H 
H: Presence of factor presented at the 75th percentile level 










For each stimuli group, the executive remuneration and company performance data 
was displayed in a standardised format to all participants as represented in Table 3.4. 
 
Table 3.4: 
Stimuli Statement Presented Each Stimuli Group Based on Effect Coding Matrix 
Stimuli Statement 
A financial services company is listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). 
According to the company’s 2013 Annual Financial Report, the executive officers of 
the company earned an average basic fixed salary of R(X₁ - H or L) per annum and 
an average annual incentive bonus of R(X₂ - H or L) per annum while the company's 
return on equity (ROE) to shareholders for the company’s fiscal year was (X₃ - H or  
L). 
 
For each stimuli group, a participant was exposed to progressively more information 
relating executive remuneration and company performance in order to investigate 
whether their perception of fairness changed through the course of the study. As such 
a time series was established for each stimuli group, consisting of three time sets 
named T₁, T₂ and T₃ respectively. In each time set the stimuli statement for the group 
remained the same. However, between time sets additional information regarding the 
state if executive remuneration was provided. The information displayed in each time 
set in given in Table 3.5. 
 
Measuring Instruments 
The measurement scale utilised in the present study consisted of close-ended items in 
order to collect quantitative data. The questionnaire was self-report and consisted of 




Perceptions of Fairness Scale. 
In order to assess participant’s perceptions of fairness and distributive justice in terms 
of the executive remuneration and company performance information that they were 
given in the stimuli group that they were randomly assigned to, a three-item scale was 
administered at each time set i.e. Y₁, Y₂ and Y₃. This scale was adapted from 
distributive justice sub-scales utilised by Colquitt (2001b) and Tyler and Blader 
(2002). Both thse scales have showed high reliability in the past with Cronbach 
Alpha’s of .93 and .76, respectively. The sub-scale made use of a 5-point semantic 
differential response scale (1 = Very Unfair, 5 = Very Fair). The questions utilised in 





Time Series – Information Given to Participants in Each Stimuli Group 
Time Set Information Provided to Participant relating to Executive Remuneration and Company Performance 
Y₁ No information provided other than stimuli statement. 
Y₂ 
Stimuli statement and information relating to remuneration and company performacen data that was extracted and 
analysed from Annual Reports were provided. 
 
Stimuli statement and descriptive data relating to average executive remuneration and company performance of all 
listed financial services organisations were provided in the table below. 
Executive Remuneration and Company 
Performance Data for South African financial 
services companies in the JSE Top 100. 
Minimum Maximum Average 
Executive Basic Salaries R 927 666 R 18 186 113 R 5 269 217 
Executive Annual Bonuses R 54 333 R 16 335 505 R 5 844 780 
Company Performance – Return on Equity (ROE) -49.42% 72.61% 18.58% 
1 
Y₃ 
Stimuli statement and descriptive data relating to the executive remuneration of the top 15 paid CEOs on the JSE as 
well as their respective company performance was provided in the table below. 









1 SABMiller* Graham Mackay R 20 749 704 R 20 244 000 R 40 993 704 13.60% 
2 Shoprite JW Basson R 40 964 000 - R 40 964 000 25.61% 
3 Sasol David Constable R 20 527 000 R 11 381 000 R 31 908 000 20.30% 
4 Bidvest Brian Joffe R 17 238 000 R 15 383 000 R 32 621 000 25.10% 
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5 BHP Biliton** Marius Kloppers R 25 525 952 - R 25 525 952 22.72% 
6 Anglo American* Cynthia Carroll R 15 120 000 R 4 470 000 R 19 590 000 -3.70% 
7 Datatec Jens Montanana R 10 728 000 R 12 984 000 R 23 712 000 11.50% 
8 MTN RS Dabengwa R 10 083 000 R 13 456 000 R 23 539 000 22.50% 
9 Old Mutual* Julian Roberts R 14 094 000 R 2 939 000 R 17 033 000 13.00% 
10 AngloGold Mark Cutifani R 17 386 000 R 2 939 000 R 20 325 000 19.00% 
11 Gold Fields Nicholas J Holland R 11 483 000 R 8 460 000 R 19 943 000 18.79% 
12 Anglo Platinum Neville Francis Nicolau R 5 037 859 - R 5 037 859 -12.60% 
13 FirstRand Sizwe Errol Nxasana R 7 481 000 R 9 600 000 R 17 081 000 21.20% 
14 Barloworld Clive Thomson R 7 686 000 R 7 871 000 R 15 557 000 11.30% 
15 Pick n Pay Stores Nick Badminton R 4 859 600 - R 4 859 600 22.10% 
* - Conversion done from £ to Rand. 





Perception of Fairness Scale 
Question Item Question 
1 
How fair do you think the average executive’s basic salary is in 
relation to the company’s performance, in terms of return on equity 
shareholders? 
2 
How fair do you think the average executive’s annual bonus is in 
relation to the company’s performance, in terms of return on equity to 
shareholders? 
3 
How fair do you think these executive’s total remuneration package 
is in relation to the company’s performance, in terms of return on 
equity to shareholders? 
 
Manipulation Check 
To conduct a manipulation check, participants were presented with the relevant 
executive remuneration and company performance information corresponding to their 
stimuli groupa and was then asked to indicate if they considered the Rand values to be 
High, Average or Low. The manipulation check was intended to determine what 
participant’s perceptions of remuneration were in relation to the real-world 
information that they were given. The aim of these questions was to assess if in fact 
respondents had an accurate understanding of the levels of remunation being paid to 
executives in the financial services industry. The questions given to the participants 









Manipulation Check Questions 
Question Item Question 
1 
Do you think the average executive’s basic salary can be considered to 
be low, medium or high in relation to other financial services 
company’s executives in South Africa? 
2 
Do you think the average executive’s annual bonus can be considered 
to be low, medium or high in relation to other financial services 
company’s executives in South Africa? 
3 
Do you think the company’s performance as measured using return on 
equity (ROE) can be considered to be low, medium or high in relation 
to other financial services company’s performance in South Africa? 
 
These questions were answered utilising a three-point nominal scale where 
participants were asked to rate the presented executive remuneration and company 
performance data presented in their assigned stimuli group as being “Low”, 
“Medium” or “High”. Given that the Rand value presented was either at the 25th, 50th 




The practice of random assignment is standard practice in experimental research to 
ensure that stimuli groups are as similar to each other as possible (Bhattacherjee, 
2012). The survey was designed in Qualtrics, which randomly assigned participants to 
one of the eight stimuli groups. This also ensured that, as far as it was possible, each 
group consisted of a similar number of participants. Random assignment also 
improves external validity as it ensures that the effects of extraneous variables are 




Data Collection Tools and Procedure 
The executive remuneration and company performance stimuli, as described above, 
were pre-designed, generated and uploaded onto Qualtrics, an online and web-based 
survey application. An electronic survey was generated and implemented utilising the 
Qualtrics software package. A qualifying question was posed to each participant, as to 
whether they worked or have a career in the South African financial services industry. 
If they answered in the affirmative then they would be randomly assigned to a stimuli 
group. If they answered in the negative, then they were taken to a page where they 
were thanked for their participation, but were informed that this survey was only 
relevant to financial services employees working in South Africa. Each respondent 
was then asked to consider one of eight stimuli which represented real world 
remuneration and company performance data extracted and analysed from JSE listed 
financial services organisations and provide their assessment of its fairness. 
As part of each stimuli group, a validation check was included in order to establish 
and benchmark participants perceptions regarding the stimuli groups’ executive 
remuneration and company performance information. As described above, within 
each group three time sets were setup, specifically T₁, T₂ and T₃, in between which 
additional executive remuneration and company performance information was given 
to the participants. At each time set, the same distributive justice scale was utilised in 
order to assess participant’s perception of fairness. This constituted the first section of 
the electronic survey. 
The second and last section of the online survey contained demographic questions to 
be able to describe the sample. This section contained demographic questions such as 
age, gender, racial group, primary language, marital status, highest qualification, 
geographic location, sector of financial services currently working in, level of 
management, employment status, years worked at current employer as well as the size 
of the organisation that they currently work for. 
The participants were sent an electronic mail with a cover letter (Appendix A) briefly 
explaining the aim of the study, as well as providing the contract details of the 
researchers, should there have been any questions, queries or concerns. Embedded in 
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the cover letter was the hyperlink to the survey. A letter from the UCT Commerce 
Ethics Committee stating that this research had been approved was included in the 
electronic mail as an additional attachment. The details of the purpose of the study 
and researcher contact details were reiterated in the cover letter of the Qualtrics 
electronic survey, once the hyperlink had been followed (Appendix B). Instructions 
for the completion of the survey were clearly presented and elaborated on, at the start 
of each section. 
The survey was incentivised with a lucky draw. One respondent was randomly chosen 
and received a voucher for a South African retail chain. This was done in order to 
facilitate and motivate participants to take part in the survey. The last question in the 
demographics section allowed participants to fill in their email address in order to be 
entered into the lucky draw. They could also provide their contact details if they 
wished to have results of the survey sent to them. These email addresses were stripped 
immediately and was never made part of the data set to so protect the identity of 
respondents. The estimated time taken to complete the survey was between 10-15 
minutes and a progress bar was displayed throughout the survey such that participants 
could monitor their progress in the survey, thereby assisting in a reduction of 
respondent fatigue and dropout (Appendix C).  
 
Statistical Analysis 
Descriptive statistics were used to assess and analyse the nature of the data collected, 
with a full-factorial Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) being used to assess the effects 
of executive remuneration and company performance on employee’s perceptions of 
fairness. A repeated measures ANOVA was then conducted in order to assess whether 
there was a statistically significant change in each time set i.e. between each stimuli 
group namely T₁, T₂ and T₃. All statistical analyses including reliability analysis, 





CHAPTER 4  
RESULTS 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the statistical results obtained from the 
various analyses performed. The following hypothesis was statistically analysed:  
Hypotheses 1: Executive remuneration (basic salary and short term incentive 
bonuses) and company performance have a significant main effect on employee’s 
perception of fairness and distributive justice.  
The Perception of Fairness scale’s validity and reliability was assessed using Principal 
Component Analysis and calculating Cronbach’s alpha, respectivly. Descriptive 
statistics were used to summarise the data collected on the perceptions of fairness, 
which was followed by a full-factorial Analysis of ANOVA to assess the main and 
interaction effects of executive remuneration and company performance on 
perceptionsof fairness, across the eight stimuli groups. Lastly, a Repeated Measures 
ANOVA for each stimuli group was used in order to investigate change in 
participants’ perceptions of fairness when presented with additional information 
relating to executive remuneration and company performance. 
 
Stimuli Group Manipulation Check 
A manipulation check for the stimuli statement in each stimuli group was conducted 
before the participants were repeatedly asked the same questions in the Perceptions of 
Fairness Scale, each time after being given additional information with regards to 
executive remuneration and company performance. Due to the use of real world 
financial data extracted from organisation’s annual reports, the manipulation check 
was administered during the full experiment. The aim of the manipulation check was 
to evaluate whether participants were able to distinguish and perceive whether 
executive’s basic salary, annual bonuses and company performance were considered 
low, medium or high in terms of the stimuli group that they had been randomly 
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assigned to, in order to investigate if participants could differentiate if the stimuli data 
they were given was in fact low (25th percentile) or high (75th percentile).  
The manipulation check revealed that there was a significant statistical difference 
between the stimuli groups irrespective of different levels of executive remuneration 
and company performance in each stimuli group. Due to the nature of the data utilised 
in the study, being that of real world data extracted and analysed from JSE listed 
financial services organisations, significant differences between the stimuli groups 
were expected.  
One-Way ANOVA. 
The descriptive statistics that were calculated for each of the eight stimuli groups with 
the observed scores shown in Table 4.1 and the associated global fairness score (Y₀) 
are shown in Table 4.2. The global fairness score for the stimuli groups was obtained 
by computing the mean for each participant in relation to the three questions they 
were asked in terms of rating their perceptions of fairness in terms of executive salary, 
executive bonuses and company performance, respectively. 
 
Table 4.1: 









High High High 
 Low 1 1 1 
 Medium 6 7 3 
 High 3 2 6 




High High Low 
 Low 0 0 4 
 Medium 10 9 7 
 High 3 4 2 
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High Low Low 
 Low 3 5 3 
 Medium 8 6 9 
 High 2 2 1 




Low Low Low 
 Low 0 0 1 
 Medium 7 7 9 
 High 7 7 4 




Low Low High 
 Low 1 1 1 
 Medium 6 5 6 
 High 4 5 4 




Low High High 
 Low 0 0 0 
 Medium 7 2 7 
 High 1 6 1 




Low High Low 
 Low 3 2 0 
 Medium 6 4 9 
 High 5 8 5 




High Low High 
 Low 3 2 0 
 Medium 6 4 9 
 High 5 8 5 







Descriptive Statistics for Stimuli Groups and Global Fairness Score  
 N Mean Std.Deviation Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence 






S1 10 2.3 .31 .10 2.05 2.49 1.67 2.67 
S2 13 2.1 .44 .12 1.86 2.40 1.67 3.00 
S3 13 1.9 .50 .14 1.54 2.15 1.00 2.67 
S4 14 2.4 .35 .09 2.20 2.61 2.00 3.00 
S5 11 2.30 .48 .15 1.98 2.63 1.33 3.00 
S6 8 2.33 .25 .09 2.12 2.54 2.00 2.67 
S7 14 2.31 .50 .13 2.02 2.60 1.33 3.00 
S8 14 2.26 .32 .09 2.07 2.45 1.67 2.67 
Total 97 2.23 .43 .044 2.14 2.31 1.00 3.00 
 
The inferential statistics for a one-way ANOVA are presented in Table 4.3 and Table 
4.4, which also show the results for Levene’s Test of Homogeneity of Variances and 
the one-way ANOVA, respectively. Levene’s Test of Homogeneity of Variances were 
not significant (p>.5) and as such it fails to reject H₀, which increases our confidence 
that the variances of each group investigated in the ANOVA can be considered equal 
and the homogeneity of variance assumption has been met. The ANOVA analysis 
revealed statistically significant differences between the stimuli groups (F (7, 89) = 
2.295, p <.05). 
 
Table 4.3: 
Levene’s Test of Homegeneity of Variances 
Levene 
Statistic 
df1 df2 Sig. 















2.74 7 .39 2.30 .03 
Within 
Groups 
15.17 89 .17   
Total 17.90 96    
 
Assessing the Unidimensionality of the Perceptions of Fairness Scale 
Validity. 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was used to test the unidimensionality of the 
perceptions of fairness scale. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity were conducted in order to conclude 
whether it was appropriate to proceed with PCA. KMO measures should be greater 
than .5, while Bartlett’s test should be significant in order for factor analysis to be 
appropriate on a data set (Burns & Burns, 2008). A significant Bartlett’s test shows 
that there is a degree of correlation between the variables (Burns & Burns, 2008). 
Both KMO and Bartlett’s test were analysed for each of the stimuli groups initial 
stimuli statement scenario in order to confirm that the perceptions of fairness scale 
were assessing the same factors. Each group was tested independently. The sample 
size was a limitation, in terms of the rule-of-thumb that for factor analysis one 
requires at least five times the cases (participants) in the sample than items (Burns & 








Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity 
for Stimuli Groups Initial Stimuli Statement 
Stimuli Group KMO and  Bartlett’s Statistics 
Stimuli Group 1 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy .60 




 df 3 
Sig. .007 
Stimuli Group 2 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .69 




 df 3 
Sig. .004 
Stimuli Group 3 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .41 




 df 3 
Sig. .004 
Stimuli Group 4 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .65 




 df 3 
Sig. .003 
Stimuli Group 5 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .57 




 df 3 
Sig. .166 
Stimuli Group 6 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .63 




 df 3 
Sig. .045 
Stimuli Group 7 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .54 




 df 3 
 Sig. .000 
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Stimuli Group 8 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .66 




 df 3 
 Sig. .073 
 
 
The KMO measure was found to be greater than .5 and Bartlett’s test significant. It 
was therefore considered appropriate to proceed with PCA. In terms of selecting 
meaningful factors, Burns and Burns (2008) recommend Kaiser’s rule which selects 
components with eigenvalues greater than 1 as they account and explain more 
variance than a single or individual item in the data set. Total variance explained in 
terms of eigenvalues for each stimuli group are shown in Table 4.6. 
 
Table 4.6: 

















1 2.19 73.08 73.08 2.19 73.08 73.08 
2 .69 22.85 95.93    
















1 2.27 75.50 75.50 2.27 75.50 75.50 
2 .49 16.35 91.85    
















1 1.88 62.78 62.78 1.88 62.78 62.78 
2 .97 32.21 94.99    


















1 2.20 73.24 73.24 2.20 73.24 73.24 
2 .58 19.31 92.54    
















1 1.82 60.84 60.84 1.83 60.84 60.84 
2 .81 27.12 87.96    
















1 2.32 77.30 77.30 2.32 77.30 77.30 
2 .50 16.59 93.90    
















1 2.49 83.084 83.08 2.49 83.08 83.08 
2 .45 14.866 97.95    
















1 1.94 64.52 64.52 1.94 64.52 64.52 
2 .61 20.47 84.99    
3 .45 15.01 100.00    
 
PCAs for all stimuli groups revealed that there was only one factor greater than 1 
(ranging from stimuli group 5 eigenvalue = 1.82 to stimuli group 7 eigenvalue = 2.49) 
and accounting for a range of variance from 60.84% (stimuli group 5) to 83.09% 
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(stimuli group 7). Factor loadings for the Perceptions of Fairness loaded significantly 
on one component, as such the scale could be considered as unidimensional and the 
factor is assumed to measure the perceptions of fairness of employees. 
 
Reliability. 
The internal consistency of the Perceptions of Fairness scale was assessed by 
calculting the Cronbach alpha cofficient. With regards to corrected item-total 
correlations, (Burns & Burns, 2008) recommend that the rule of thumb in terms of 
item deletion is that items with a corrected item-total correlation of less than .30 be 
removed. No items were deleted as all items had item-total correlations greater than 
.30. It was thus decided to retain all items. The Perceptions of Fairness scale was, 
based on these results, considered reliable. See Table 4.7 for reliability statistics for 
the scale per stimuli group. 
 
Table 4.7: 
Reliability Statistics for Perceptions of Fairness Scale 
 
Stimuli Group Cronbach Alpha N of Items 
S1 .798 3 
S2 .798 3 
S3 .831 3 
S4 .665 3 
S5 .815 3 
S6 .639 3 
S7 .805 3 
S8 .895 3 
 
 




The descriptive statistics section provides a numerical comparison of the perceptions 
of fairness scale with the mean scores for the eight stimuli group. This will be done 
for each time set, namely Y₁, Y₂ and Y₃. 
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Y₁ - Stimuli Statement. 
Table 4.8 provides a summary of the descriptive statistics for the perceptions of 
fairness score. Perceptions of fairness was measured on a five-point semantic 
differential scale with 5 indicating the highest score and a perception of very fair, 3 
indicating the midpoint which was neutral and 1 indicating the lowest score and a 
perception of very unfair. The overall mean score for perceptions of fairness was 
marginally above the midpoint of the scale, indicating that overall participants were 
neutral in terms of how they perceived executive remuneration and company 
performance for be fair. 
 
Table 4.8: 
Descriptive Statistics for Perceptions of Fairness (Y1) (n = 97) 





97 2 5 3.20 .78 
 
Table 4.9 below provides a summary of the descriptive statistics for each of the 
variables manipulated in the stimuli groups, namely executive basic salary, executive 
STIB and company performance in terms of ROE. There is almost no numerical 
variance between the means of the variables, either at the 75th or 25th percentile. 
Figure 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 below show that there is almost no numerical difference in the 
means of the variables. 
 
Table 4.9: 
Descriptive Statistics for Executive Basic Salary, Executive STIBs and Company 
Performance (n = 97) 








50 2 5 3.19 .79 
25th 
percentile 





45 2 5 3.19 .90 
25th 
percentile 





43 2 5 3.29 .72 
25th 
percentile 
53 2 5 3.13 .82 
 
Figure 4.1 below shows that there is little difference in the variability of the 









Figure 4.2 below shows that the variability in the perceptions of fairness scores in 
terms of executive STIB at the 75th and 25th. 
 
 
 Figure 4.2. Comparison of the means for Executive STIB. 
 
Figure 4.3 below shows the variability in the perceptions of fairness scores in terms of 
company performance at the 75th and 25th percentile. 
 
 





Y₂ - Descriptive Data of Listed Financial Services Organisations Given. 
Table 4.10 provides a summary of the descriptive statistics for the overall perception 
of fairness score. Perceptions of fairness was measured on a five-point semantic 
differential scale with 5 indicating the highest score and a perception of very fair, 3 
indicating the midpoint which was neutral and 1 indicating the lowest score and a 
perception of very unfair. The mean score for perceptions of fairness was marginally 
above the midpoint of the scale, indicating that overall participants were neutral in 




Descriptive Statistics for Perceptions of Fairness (Y1) (n = 97) 





97 2 5 3.12 .90 
 
Table 4.11 below provides a summary of the descriptive statistics for each of the 
variables manipulated in the stimuli groups, namely executive basic salary, executive 
STIB and company performance in terms of ROE. Figure 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 below 
shows the means and variance of the variables. 
 
Table 4.11: 
Descriptive Statistics for Executive Basic Salary, Executive STIB and Company 
Performance (n = 97) 
 Condition N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Executive 75th 49 1 5 3.14 .89 
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Basic Salary percentile 
25th 
percentile 





45 1 5 3.16 .98 
25th 
percentile 





42 2 5 3.26 .90 
25th 
percentile 
54 1 5 3.01 .90 
 
Figure 4.4 below graphicaly represents the perceptions of fairness scores in terms of 
executive basic salary at the 75th and 25th percentile. 
 
 
 Figure 4.4. Comparison of the means for Executive Basic Salary. 
 
 
Figure 4.5 below shows the numerical variability in the perceptions of fairness scores 









Figure 4.6 below shows the numerical variability in the perceptions of fairness scores 
in terms of company performance at the 75th and 25th percentile. 
 
 
 Figure 4.6. Comparison of the means for Company Performance. 
 
Y₃ - Descriptive Data for Executive Remuneration and Company Performance of 
Top 15 South African CEOs Given. 
Table 4.12 provides a summary of the descriptive statistics for the perceptions of 
fairness score. Perceptions of fairness was measured on a five-point semantic 
differential scale with 5 indicating the highest score and a perception of very fair, 3 
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indicating the midpoint which was neutral and 1 indicating the lowest score and a 
perception of very unfair. The mean score for perceptions of fairness was marginally 
above the midpoint of the scale, indicating that overall participants were neutral in 




Descriptive Statistics for Perceptions of Fairness (Y1) (n = 95) 





95 1 5 3.06 1.02 
 
Table 4.13 below provides a summary of the descriptive statistics for each of the 
variables manipulated in the stimuli groups, namely executive basic salary, executive 
STIB and company performance in terms of ROE. Figure 4.7 4.8, and 4.9 below show 
that the distributions are quite similar. 
 
Table 4.13: 
Descriptive Statistics for Executive Basic Salary, Executive STIB and Company 
Performance (n = 97) 







49 1 5 3.28 1.02 
25th 
percentile 















42 1 5 3.13 1.04 
25th 
percentile 
53 1 5 3 1.01 
 
Figure 4.7 below shows the numerical variability in the perceptions of fairness scores 
in terms of executive basic salary at the 75th and 25th percentile. 
 
 
 Figure 4.7.Comparison of the means for Executive Basic Salary. 
 
Figure 4.8 below shows the numerical variability in the perceptions of fairness scores 





 Figure 4.8. Comparison of the means for Executive STIB. 
 
 
Figure 4.9 below shows the numerical variability in the perceptions of fairness scores 
in terms of company performance at the 75th and 25th percentile. 
 
 
 Figure 4.9. Comparison of the means for Company Performance. 
 
Full Factorial Analysis of Variance for Executive Remuneration and Company 
Performance 
A Full-Factorial ANOVA was used to test the statistical differences between the 
means obtained for the eight groups. Factorial ANOVA compares the variance 
between the different groups with the variability within each of the groups. An F ratio 
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indicates whether there is more variability between the groups than there is within the 
groups. Thus the Factorial ANOVA indicated whether in fact the F ratio was 
significant or not, which precipitates the question of whether to reject or fail to reject 
the null hypothesis. The Factorial ANOVA was run independently for each time set, 
namely Y₁, Y₂ and Y₃. 
 
Y₁ - Stimuli Statement. 
The main effects of executive remuneration and company performance were each 
assessed using a Factorial ANOVA. The results indicated that all three factors did not 
have a statistically significant main effect. These results indicated that there were no 
statistically significant main effects and therefore that there was no statistically 
significant difference between the mean scores for fairness.  




Estimated Marginal Means – Dependent Variable: Y1 
Executive Basic Salary 
 Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Low 3.22 .12 2.98 3.45 
High 3.19 .12 2.97 3.42 
Executive STIB 




   Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Low 3.22 .11 3 3.44 
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High 3.19 .12 2.95 3.44 
Company Performance 




   Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Low 3.13 .11 2.9 3.34 
High 3.28 .12 3.04 3.53 
 
Table 4.15: 


















1.379a 7 .197 .310 .948 .024 2.172 .138 
Intercept 961.434 1 961.434 1513.872 .000 .944 1513.872 1.000 
X1 .012 1 .012 .019 .890 .000 .019 .052 
X2 .012 1 .012 .019 .890 .000 .019 .052 
X3 .587 1 .587 .925 .339 .010 .925 .158 
X1 * X2 .142 1 .142 .223 .638 .003 .223 .075 
X1 * X3 .548 1 .548 .863 .355 .010 .863 .151 
X2 * X3 .004 1 .004 .007 .934 .000 .007 .051 
X1 * X2 * 
X3 
.002 1 .002 .002 .960 .000 .002 .050 
Error 56.522 89 .635      
Total 1052.889 97       
Corrected 
Total 
57.901 96       
 
a. R Squared = .024 (Adjusted R Squared = -.053) 




Y₂ - Descriptive Data of Listed Financial Services Organisations Given. 
The main effects of executive remuneration and company performance were each 
assessed using a Factorial ANOVA. The results indicated that all three factors did not 
have a statistically significant main effect. These results indicated that there were no 
statistically significant main effects and therefore that there was no statistically 
significant difference between the mean scores for fairness. See Table 4.16 for 
estimated marginal means and Table 4.17 for Tests of Between-Subject Effects. 
 
Table 4.16: 
Estimated Marginal Means – Dependent Variable: Y2 
Executive Basic Salary 
 Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Low 3.1 .13 2.83 3.37 
High 3.17 .13 2.9 3.43 
Executive STIB 




   Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Low 3.1 .13 2.84 3.35 
High 3.17 .14 2.9 3.45 
Company Performance 




   Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Low 3.01 .12 2.76 3.26 























3.949a 7 .564 .678 .690 .051 4.748 .276 
Intercept 911.278 1 911.278 1095.688 .000 .926 1095.688 1.000 
X1 .119 1 .119 .143 .706 .002 .143 .066 
X2 .147 1 .147 .177 .675 .002 .177 .070 
X3 1.422 1 1.422 1.710 .194 .019 1.710 .253 
X1 * X2 1.261 1 1.261 1.516 .221 .017 1.516 .230 
X1 * X3 1.114 1 1.114 1.340 .250 .015 1.340 .208 
X2 * X3 .053 1 .053 .063 .802 .001 .063 .057 
X1 * X2 * 
X3 
.027 1 .027 .033 .856 .000 .033 .054 
Error 73.189 88 .832      
Total 1012.556 96       
Corrected 
Total 
77.138 95       
 
a. R Squared = .024 (Adjusted R Squared = -.024) 
b. Computed using alpha = .05 
 
Y₃ - Descriptive Data for Executive Remuneration and Company Performance of 
Top 15 South African CEOs Given. 
The main effects of executive remuneration and company performance were each 
assessed using a Factorial ANOVA. The results indicated that all three factors did not 
have a statistically significant main effect. These results indicated that there were no 
statistically significant main effects and therefore that there was no statistically 
significant difference between the mean scores of the fairness variables. See Table 






Estimated Marginal Means – Dependent Variable: Y3 
Executive Basic Salary 
 Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Low 2.8 .15 2.49 3.1 
High 3.29 .15 3 3.58 
Executive STIB 




   Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Low 3.08 .14 2.8 3.37 
High 3.01 .16 2.7 3.32 
Company Performance 




   Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Low 3 .14 2.72 3.27 
High 3.09 .16 2.78 3.41 
 
Table 4.19: 



















9.199a 7 1.314 1.290 .265 .094 9.030 .522 
Intercept 854.085 1 854.085 838.454 .000 .906 838.454 1.000 
X1 5.608 1 5.608 5.505 .021 .060 5.505 .641 
X2 .136 1 .136 .134 .715 .002 .134 .065 
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X3 .203 1 .203 .199 .657 .002 .199 .073 
X1 * X2 .026 1 .026 .025 .874 .000 .025 .053 
X1 * X3 3.470 1 3.470 3.407 .068 .038 3.407 .447 
X2 * X3 .362 1 .362 .356 .553 .004 .356 .091 
X1 * X2 * 
X3 
.005 1 .005 .005 .943 .000 .005 .051 
Error 88.622 87 1.019      
Total 986.139 95       
Corrected 
Total 
97.820 94       
 
a. R Squared = .024 (Adjusted R Squared = -.021) 
b. Computed using alpha = .05 
 
Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance 
A Repeated Measures ANOVA was used to test the statistical differences between the 
means of the three variables, namely executive basic salary, executive STIB and 
company performance over time. Repeated Measures ANOVA compares the variance 
within each group with the variability over time. An F ratio indicates whether there is 
more variability between the groups than there is within the groups. Thus the 
Repeated Measures ANOVA indicated whether in fact the F ratio was significant or 
not, which precipitates the question of whether to reject or fail to reject the null 
hypothesis. The Repeated Measures ANOVA was run by split group analysis. See 
Table 4.20 for descriptive statistics. 
 
Table 4.20: 
Descriptive Statistics for Repeated Measures ANOVA 
Stimuli Group Mean Std. Deviation N 
S1 Y1 3.37 .987 10 
 Y2 3.60 .953 10 
 Y3 3.57 1.043 10 
S2 Y1 3.08 .964 13 
 Y2 3.05 1.079 13 
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 Y3 2.97 1.258 13 
S3 Y1 3.00 .624 13 
 Y2 2.82 .661 13 
 Y3 3.13 .996 13 
S4 Y1 3.26 .818 14 
 Y2 3.17 .884 14 
 Y3 3.07 .786 14 
S5 Y1 3.27 .467 11 
 Y2 3.18 1.058 11 
 Y3 2.64 1.233 11 
S6 Y1 3.17 .873 8 
 Y2 3.04 .863 8 
 Y3 2.67 .854 8 
S7 Y1 3.10 .907 13 
 Y2 2.97 1.013 13 
 Y3 2.82 1.059 13 
S8 Y1 3.36 .645 13 
 Y2 3.21 .752 13 
 Y3 3.50 .714 13 
 
The Repeated Measures ANOVA results showed that time and exposure to additional 
information did not significantly alter employee’s perceptions of fairness over time as 
Wilks’ Lamba was not significant for all stimuli groups. See Table 4.21 for 
multivariate test statistics, which include Wilks’ Lamba. 
 
Table 4.21: 
Multivariate Tests for Repeated Measures ANOVA 
Stimuli 
Group 
Effect Test Value F 
Hypothesis 
df 




.129 .594b 2.000 8.000 .575 
Wilks' 
Lambda 
.871 .594b 2.000 8.000 .575 
Hotelling's 
Trace 










.014 .081b 2.000 11.000 .923 
Wilks' 
Lambda 
.986 .081b 2.000 11.000 .923 
Hotelling's 
Trace 








.138 .883b 2.000 11.000 .441 
Wilks' 
Lambda 
.862 .883b 2.000 11.000 .441 
Hotelling's 
Trace 








.047 .294b 2.000 12.000 .751 
Wilks' 
Lambda 
.953 .294b 2.000 12.000 .751 
Hotelling's 
Trace 








.279 1.742b 2.000 9.000 .229 
Wilks' 
Lambda 
.721 1.742b 2.000 9.000 .229 
Hotelling's 
Trace 













.791 .795b 2.000 6.000 .494 
Hotelling's 
Trace 








.144 .927b 2.000 11.000 .424 
Wilks' 
Lambda 
.856 .927b 2.000 11.000 .424 
Hotelling's 
Trace 








.230 1.645b 2.000 11.000 .237 
Wilks' 
Lambda 
.770 1.645b 2.000 11.000 .237 
Hotelling's 
Trace 




.299 1.645b 2.000 11.000 .237 
a. Design: Intercept Within Subjects Design: Time 
b. Exact statistic 
 
Summary of Results 
The aim of this chapter was to present and discuss the results obtained from the 
various statistical analyses performed. The hypothesis was statistically analysed and 
the results indicated that there was no support for the hypothesis that Executive 
remuneration (basic salary and short term incentive bonuses) and company 
performance have a significant main effect on employee’s perception of fairness and 
distributive justice. A Full-Factorial ANOVA was conducted to assess the main 
effects of the data for the Perceptions of Fairness scale. The Factorial ANOVA did not 
show significant main effects for any of the eight stimuli groups. Repeated Measures 
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ANOVA was used within each stimuli group in order to investigate if employee’s 
perceptions changed over time, after presenting information, but the results were not 
significant indicating that fairness perceptions remained stable despite respondents 
























As what is perceived as excessive executive remuneration packages of CEOs in South 
Africa continues to be widely publicised and an area of rampant public debate, the 
question will continue to be asked if in fact executive remuneration in related, 
commensurate and in line with company performance metrics. Furthermore, one must 
ask the question as to how employees within these organisations perceive these 
remuneration packages to be fair or unfair and as a consequence of this perception 
what are the effects of distributive justice on employees as well as the organisations 
they work for? 
Research Question, Hypothesis and Design 
The current study aimed to assess whether executive remuneration, consisting of basic 
salary and short term incentive bonuses as well as company performance in terms of 
return on equity had an effect on the perceptions of fairness of employees working in 
the financial services industry in South Africa. The research hypothesis was derived 
from the research question was the following: 
H₁: Executive remuneration (basic salary and short term incentive bonuses) and 
company performance have a significant main effect on employee’s perception of 
fairness and distributive justice.  
The research question was investigated using a 2³ Full-factorial Experimental Design 
with a sample size of 97 participants. The Full-factorial design was needed to capture 
the complexity of the hypothesised interaction between executive basic salary, 
executive STIB and company performance and how they effect perceptions of 
fairness. Using real world JSE listed financial service organisation’s Annual Reports 
executive remuneration and company performance data was extracted and analysed in 
order to create stimuli groups which contained combinations of different executive 
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basic, STIB and company performance metrics. This was developed through an effect 
coding matrix with the relevant date that was either at the 25th or 75th percentile range. 
The randomly assigned stimuli was accompanied by a Perceptions of Fairness scale. 
The results were analysed by a One-Way ANOVA, Principal Component Analysis for 
the Perceptions of Fairness scale and a Factorial as well as a Repeated Measures 
ANOVA. All statistical analysis was completed using IBM SPSS Statistics, Version 
22. 
Practical Significance 
Due to the small sample size and diminished power statistics, the implication of these 
results is not applicable to the population of financial services employees in South 
Africa. 
Summary of Findings 
Prior to commencing statistical analyses of the research data in order to ascertain if 
executive remuneration and company performance have a significant effect on 
employee’s perception of fairness and distributive justice, a manipulation check was 
done. The manipulation check increased confidence in the variance that exist between 
each individual stimuli group as such met the homogeneity of variance assumption 
revealing statistical differences between the groups. However, the observed scores 
within each stimuli group’s validation questions showed that participants were not 
able to correctly judge when executive basics, executive STIBs or ROE were being 
shown at the 25th or 75th percentile. Participants on average responded that executive 
basic, STIBs and ROE were moderately fair showing little or no understanding or 
knowledge of what constituted high or low levels of these factors and as such no 
perception of either a low fairness or high fairness scenario. Due to the premise that 
all stimuli groups used and presented to participant’s real world executive 
remuneration and company performance data, statistical analysis proceeded. 
PCA confirmed that the perceptions of fairness scale was unidimensional and valid 
across all stimuli groups, assessing the perceptions of fairness of employees through 
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the scale. Reliability was assessed using Cronbach alpha, which determined that all 
item-total correlations were reliable in each stimuli group. 
Descriptive statistics showed that there was no statistical and almost no numerical 
variance in the mean global fairness scores of executive basic salary, executive STIBs 
or Company Performance (ROE) when the 25th and 75th percentiles are compared. 
This is consistent over each time set, namely Y₁, Y₂ and Y₃ where progressively more 
information was displayed, yet employee’s perceptions of fairness remain consistent 
and do not change once being exposed to more information relating to real world 
executive remuneration and company performance data. 
ANOVA was run between each stimuli group in each time set and the tests revealed 
that there was no significant differences between the groups in each time set. A 
Repeated Measures ANOVA was used to test if there was a statistically significant 
difference in the global fairness scores of participants over the time sets whereby they 
were given additional information in each set. There were no statistically significant 
differences in each stimuli group when a Repeated Measures ANOVA was conducted. 
Based on the above results, we cannot reject the null hypothesis and as such that 
executive remuneration (basic salary and short term incentive bonuses) and company 
performance do not have a significant effect on employee’s perception of fairness and 
distributive justice. 
The results of the above are not entirely unexpected or unforeseen due to a number of 
factors such as trust and reliance on corporate governance measures, remuneration 
committees as well as employee’s general indifference to executive remuneration and 
company performance as it may never actually effect them. Factors that may have 
influenced employees perceptions of fairness are discussed below. 
 Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance measures have always been a requirement in the corporate 
organisational landscape ensuring accountability, transparency and alignment of core 
functions to the organisation’s business and the industry it operates in. This is 
particularly true with the introduction of King III – Code of Governance Principles. 
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While the guidelines and principles embodied in King and adhered in the South 
African corporate environment have been recognised internationally, research in the 
South African context has found a non-existant to weak correlation exists between 
CEO compensation and company performance (Bradley, 2013; Institue of Directors, 
n.d.). This suggests that attempts to align the interests of executives and shareholders 
through executive pay structures has been largely unsuccessful thus far. This is 
obviously not good news for shareholders as executives interest may in fact not be 
aligned to their own thereby resulting in lower returns, which would reflect in a poor 
ROE percentage. This translates into problems for policymakers and economists as 
executives are not motivated to push the boundaries of company performance which 
may in the medium to long term have detrimental effects on the South African 
economy’s efficiency (Bradley, 2013; Resnick, 2013; Scholtz & Smit, 2012; 
Theunissen & Oberholzer, 2013). This may translate into financial services 
employee’s perception of fairness to be influenced in as far as them being indifferent 
to how executives are remunerated as they are aware that there is very little or no 
correlation between executive’s performance and their remuneration. This would be 
particularly true if financial services employees are incentivised in terms of 
performance bonuses based on their individual performance and are penalised or 
rewarded accordingly while at the same time the organisation’s executives are paid 
high STIBs when the company’s ROE is low or sub-standard in terms of the industry 
norm. It could still be argued that the above scenario could be perceived as the highly 
unfair by the employee if one were the apply the equity theory framework. This leads 
onto the next factor that plays a role in driving and shaping a financial services 
employee perception of fairness and distributive justice, that of inequality in terms of 
the distribution of wealth in the South African population. 
 Inequality and Distribution of Wealth in South African Population 
While South Africa may not be the most unequal country in the world anymore, it 
currently ranks number 3 on the list according to the World Bank’s updated Gini 
coefficient score of 59.6 (BusinessTech, 2014). The Gini coefficient is a measure of 
the extent to which the distribution of income or consumable expenditure among 
individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal 
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distribution, which is measured at 0.0 (BusinessTech, 2014; Kiersz, 2014). The US 
and China have scores of 41.1 and 42.1 respectively, with the average among all 
countries being 38.8 (BusinessTech, 2014; Kiersz, 2014). The relevance of this 
inequality to the above study is that employees in the financial services industry are 
well educated and well remunerated when compared to other sectors of the South 
African economy. While they are aware of the inequality that exists in South Africa in 
terms of wealth distribution they may or may not be directly or indirectly affected by 
this. Bradley's (2013) findings relating to executive remuneration in the various 
sectors of the South African economy observed that executives in the financial 
services sector receive lower average salaries than the minig sector (on average 
R3 111 500 lower) and the industrial sector (on average R2 285 070 lower). This 
offset by the fact that financial services executives receive significantly higher 
average bonuses that the mining sector (on average R6 213 000 higher) and the 
industrial sector (R 3 511 180 higher). The above can be attributed to the different 
environment that financial services operates in whereby variable remuneration forms 
a greater part of the remuneration package of executives (Bradley, 2013; Resnick, 
2013; Scholtz & Smit, 2012; Theunissen & Oberholzer, 2013). Due to the relatively 
smaller supply of CEOs who can serve in the financial sector, the offering of higher 
bonuses can be attributed to retaining their services. Furthermore, the financial 
services sector has a significantly lower average ROE than the mining sector (on 
average 13.61% lower), with ROA in being 17.72% lower than the mining sector and 
11.92% lower than the industry sector. In summary, the financial services industry has 
far more corporate governance structures in place as well being a far more regulated 
industry in terms of governance and oversight from the Financial Services Board 
(FSB) thereby leading to a far more equal sector whereby both executive 
remuneration structures as well as employees remuneration structures are far more 
aligned to each other.  
In conclusion, this study was undertaken in order investigate if employee’s 
perceptions of fairness and distributive justice were effected by executive’s 
remuneration and company performance, of the industry that they worked in. For the 
purposes of this study, the financial services industry was the focus due to these 
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employees readily having access to technology as well as being on the whole more 
educated than any other industry’s workforce in the South African context. Due to the 
corporate governance and perceived equality in the sector, employees were neutral in 
their perceptions of fairness toward executive remuneration and company 
performance.   
Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research 
Limitations for the current study were assessed and future recommendations are 
offered to improve on the limitations identified. Suggestions for future research are 
also included in order to expand upon the current study. 
 Sample and target population. 
The sample group was sourced through non-probability convenience sampling. The 
first limitation of using non-probability convenience sampling was that the sample 
group may not have been adequately representative of the entire population. Lastly, 
the sample size was particularly small where n = 97. For a 2³ Factorial Design a 
sample size of 240 participants is required for statistical significance. In future studies 
a probability sample should be sought with a suitable sample size. 
  Focus on different industrial sectors. 
As discussed in the introduction to this research, one of the outcomes that was hoped 
for was the reconciliation and comparison of the public opinion in terms of 
perceptions of fariness relating to executive remuneration and company performance 
and that of employees in the same context. Public and employee opinion has been 
most often and vehemently voiced in the sectors of mining and industry rather than in 
financial services. For future studies employees perception of fairness should be 
investigated in the abovementioned sectors specifically mining. There are however 
serious logistical and equality issues relating to conducting research in the mining 
sector due to the nature of the work done, little or no access to technology, lack of 
education as well as the fact that most of the mining workforce lives in poverty while 
executives and senior management in the sector are paid relative high basics as well 
as bonuses relative to executives in other sectors. 
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 Perceptions of Fairness Scale range limitation. 
The scale utilised in this study consisted of three items that were rated on a 5 point 
semantic differential scale. Results show that participant’s responses in terms of 
perceptions of fairness were heavily centred around a neutral response. In future 
research the scale needs to be expanded to have more items that assess perceptions of 
fairness as well as investigating whether the rating scale can be widened to a 7 or even 
a 10 point scale. 
 Longitudinal studies. 
The research undertaken in this study only looked at a ‘snapshot’ of executive 
remuneration and company performance over the period of the publishing of one set 
of annual financial reports and statements, it does not take into account that 
executives work for a number of years at an organisation and are remunerated in 
accordance with their experience and length of tenure. This study also did not take 
into account the share and stock options that are given and realised by executives as 
part of their remuneration packages. Future studies should account for and utilise this 
information to investigate how perceptions of fairness of employees change when 
exposed to this information. 
 Focus on procedural justice rather than distributive justice. 
This study has investigated the distributive justice, the executive remuneration and 
company performance in terms of actual real world data and the above 
recommendations for future studies have been made. Another area or branch of 
research that can be investigated is that of employees perceptions of fairness in terms 
of the how executives remuneration is actually calculated and what they are required 
to achieve in order to meet said benchmarks.  
Conclusion 
The aim of the study was to establish whether executive remuneration, executive 
bonuses and company performance effected South African financial services 
employee’s perceptions of fairness. The results of the study show that there is no 
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statistical difference between the stimuli groups and the financial data participants 
were exposed to. Future studies hold promise should the limitations discussed above 
to addressed and overcome as there are implications for organisational citizenship 
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